We show that any concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for a non-trivial language (i.e., for a language outside BPP), whose security is proven via black-box simulation, must use at least (log n) rounds of interaction. This result achieves a substantial improvement over previous lower bounds, and is the rst bound to rule out the possibility of constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge when proven via black-box simulation. Furthermore, the bound is polynomially related to the number of rounds in the best known concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for languages in NP (which is established via black-box simulation).
the protocol. Since it seems unrealistic (and certainly undesirable) for honest provers to coordinate their actions so that zero-knowledge is preserved, we must assume that in each prover-veri er pair the prover acts independently.
Loosely speaking, a zero-knowledge proof is said to be concurrent zero-knowledge if it remains zero-knowledge even when executed in the concurrent setting. Recall that in order to demonstrate that a certain protocol is zero-knowledge it is required to demonstrate that the view of every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary interacting with the prover can be simulated by a probabilistic polynomial-time machine (a.k.a. the simulator). In the concurrent setting, the veri ers' view may include multiple sessions running at the same time. Furthermore, the veri ers may have control over the scheduling of the messages in these sessions (i.e., the order in which the interleaved execution of these sessions should be conducted). As a consequence, the simulator's task in the concurrent setting becomes considerably more complicated. In particular, standard techniques, based on \rewinding the adversary", run into trouble.
Previous Work
Constructing a \round-e cient" concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for all languages in NP, or even nontrivial languages (outside of BPP) seems to be a challenging task. Intuition on the diculty of this problem is given in 12], where it was argued that for a speci c 4-round zero-knowledge protocol and a speci c recursive scheduling of n sessions, the straightforward adaptation of the simulator to the concurrent setting requires time exponential in n. The rst lower bound demonstrating the di culty of concurrent zero-knowledge was given by Kilian, Petrank and Racko 26] who showed, building on the techniques of Goldreich and Krawczyk 18] , that for every language outside BPP there is no 4-round protocol whose concurrent execution is simulatable in polynomial-time by a black-box simulator. (A black-box simulator is a simulator that has only black-box access to the adversarial veri er. Essentially all previously known proofs of security of zero-knowledge protocols use black-box simulators. An exception is the protocol of 22], which uses a non-standard assumption of a "non black-box" nature.) This lower bound was later improved by Rosen to seven rounds 29] .
Indeed, even ignoring issues of round e ciency, it was not clear whether there exists a concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for nontrivial languages, without modifying the underlying model. Richardson and Kilian 28] exhibited a family of concurrent zero-knowledge protocols (parameterized by the number of rounds) for all languages in NP. Their original analysis showed how to simulate in polynomial-time n O(1) concurrent sessions only when the number of rounds in the protocol is at least n (for some arbitrary > 0). This result has recently been substantially improved by Kilian and Petrank 25] , who show that the Richardson-Kilian protocol remains concurrent zero-knowledge even if it has O(g(n) log 2 n) rounds, where g( ) is any non-constant function (e.g., g(n) = log log n).
We note that previously there was a considerable gap between the known upper and lower bounds on the round-complexity of concurrent zero-knowledge (i.e., 25, 29] ): the best known protocol hasÕ(log 2 n) rounds whereas the lower bound necessitates 7 rounds (via black-box simulation). 1 In particular, the question consisting of whether constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge protocols exist has been open.
Our Result
We substantially narrow the above gap by presenting a lower bound on the number of rounds required by concurrent zero-knowledge. We show that in the context of black-box concurrent zeroknowledge,~ (log n) rounds of interaction are essential for non-trivial proof systems. 2 This bound is the rst to rule out the possibility of constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge, when proven via black-box simulation. Furthermore, the bound is polynomially related to the number of rounds in the best known concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for languages outside BPP ( 25] ). Our main result is stated in the following theorem. Theorem 1.1 Let r : N ! N be a function so that r(n) = o( log n log log n ). Suppose that hP; V i is an r( )-round proof system for a language L (i.e., on input x, the number of messages exchanged is at most r(jxj)), and that concurrent executions of P can be simulated in polynomial-time using blackbox simulation. Then L 2 BPP. The theorem holds even if the proof system is only computationallysound (with negligible soundness error) and the simulation is only computationally-indistinguishable (from the actual executions).
Techniques
The proof of Theorem 1.1 builds on the works of Goldreich and Krawczyk 18], Kilian, Petrank and Racko 26], and Rosen 29] . On a very high level, the proof proceeds by constructing a speci c concurrent schedule of sessions, and demonstrating that a black-box simulator cannot successfully generate a simulated accepting transcript for this schedule unless it \rewinds" the veri er many times. The work spent on these rewindings will be super-polynomial unless the number of rounds used by the protocol obeys the bound, or L 2 BPP. While the general outline of the proof remains roughly the same as in 18, 26, 29] , the actual schedule of sessions, and its analysis, are new. One main idea that, together with other ideas, enables the proof of the bound is to have the veri er abort sessions depending on the history of the interaction. A more detailed outline, presenting both the general structure and the new ideas in the proof, appears in Section 3.
Remark: The concurrent schedule in our proof is xed and known to everybody. As a consequence, Theorem 1.1 is actually stronger than stated. It will hold even if the simulator knows the schedule in advance (in particular, it knows the number of concurrent sessions), and even if the schedule of the messages does not change dynamically (as a function of the history of the interaction).
Conclusions and Open Problems 1.4.1 Alternative models
The lower bound presented here draws severe limitations on the ability of black-box simulators to cope with the standard concurrent zero-knowledge setting, and provides motivation to consider relaxations of and augmentations to the standard model. Indeed, several works have managed to \bypass" the di culty in constructing concurrent zero-knowledge protocols by modifying the standard model in a number of ways. Dwork, Naor and Sahai augment the communication model with assumptions on the maximum delay of messages and skews of local clocks of parties 12, 13] . Damg ard uses a common random string 11], and Canetti et.al. use a public registry le 7] . A di erent approach would be to try and achieve security properties that are weaker than zero-knowledge but are still useful. For example, Feige and Shamir consider the notion of witness indistinguishability 14, 15] , which is preserved under concurrent composition.
Alternative simulation techniques
Loosely speaking, the only advantage that a black-box simulator may have over the honest prover is the ability to \rewind" the interaction and explore di erent execution paths before proceeding with the simulation (as its access to the veri er's strategy is restricted to the examination of input/output behavior). As we show in our proof, such a mode of operation (i.e., the necessity to rewind every session) is a major contributor to the hardness of simulating many concurrent sessions. It is thus natural to think that a simulator that deviates from this paradigm (i.e., is non black-box, in the sense that is does not have to rewind the adversary in order to obtain a faithful simulation of the conversation), would essentially bypass the main problem that arises while trying to simulate many concurrent sessions.
Hada and Tanaka 22] have considered some weaker variants of zero-knowledge, and exhibited a three-round protocol for NP (whereas only BPP has three-round block-box zero-knowledge 18]).
Their protocol was an example for a zero-knowledge protocol not proven secure via black-box simulation. Alas, their analysis was based in an essential way on a strong and highly non-standard hardness assumption. In a recent breakthrough result, Barak 2] constructs a constant-round protocol for all languages in NP whose zero-knowledge property is proved using a non black-box simulator. Such a method of simulation enables him to bypass our impossiblity result (as well as 18, 26, 29] ), and to perform cryptographic tasks otherwise considered inachievable. In particular, for every (predetermined) polynomial p( ), there exists a version of Barak's protocol that preserves its zero-knowledge property even when it is executed p(n) times concurrently (where n denotes the size of the common input).
As we show in our work, this task is unachievable via black-box simulation (unless NP BPP).
Open problems
At rst glance, it seems that Barak's protocol completely resolves the question of whether constantround concurrent zero-knowledge protocol exist. Taking a closer look, however, one notices that the (polynomial) number of concurrent sessions relative to which the protocol should be secure is determined before the protocol is speci ed. Moreover, it turns out that the messages in the protocol are required to be longer than the number of concurrent sessions. Thus, from both a theoretical and a practical point of view, Barak's protocol is still not satisfactory. What we would like to have is a single protocol that preserves its zero-knowledge property even when it is executed concurrently for any (not predetermined) polynomial number of times. Such a property is indeed satis ed by the protocols of 28, 25] (alas these protocols are not constant-round). This leaves open the question of whether constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge protocol indeed exist for all languages in NP.
Preliminaries 2.1 Probabilistic Notation
Denote by x r X the process of uniformly choosing an element x in a set X. If B( ) is an event depending on the choice of x r X, then Pr x X B(x)] (alternatively, Pr x B(x)]) denotes the probability that B(x) holds when x is chosen with probability 1=jXj. Namely, where is an indicator function so that (B) = 1 if event B holds, and equals zero otherwise. This notation extends in the natural way for events B( ; : : : ; ) that depend on k variables x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x k that are uniformly chosen in k (possibly di erent) sets X 1 ; X 2 ; : : : ; X k . That is, we denote by Pr x 1 ;x 2 ;:::;x k B(x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x k )] the probability that B(x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x k ) holds when x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x k are chosen with probability 1=(jX 1 j jX 2 j jX k j).
Interactive proofs
We use the standard de nitions of interactive proofs (interactive Turing machines) 21, 16] and arguments (a.k.a computationally-sound proofs) 5]. Given a pair of interactive Turing machines, P and V , we denote by hP; V i(x) the random variable representing the (local) output of V when interacting with machine P on common input x, when the random input to each machine is uniformly and independently chosen. We consider interactive proof systems in which the soundness error is negligible. The term negligible is used for denoting functions that are (asymptotically) smaller than one over any polynomial. More precisely, a function ( ) from non-negative integers to reals is called negligible if for every constant c > 0 and all su ciently large n, it holds that (n) < n ?c . This is so, since the soundness error can always be made negligible by su ciently many parallel repetitions of the protocol (as such may occur anyhow in the concurrent model). However, we do not know whether this condition can be relaxed in the case of computationally sound proofs (i.e., when the soundness condition is required to hold only for machines B that are implementable by poly-size circuits). In particular, in this case parallel repetitions do not necessarily reduce the soundness error (cf. 3]).
Concurrent zero-knowledge
Let hP; V i be an interactive proof for a language L, and consider a concurrent adversary (veri er) V that, given input x 2 L, interacts with an unbounded number of independent copies of P (all on common input x). The concurrent adversary V is allowed to interact with the various copies of P concurrently, without any restrictions over the scheduling of the messages in the di erent interactions with P (in particular, V has control over the scheduling of the messages in these interactions). The transcript of a concurrent interaction consists of the common input x, followed by the sequence of prover and veri er messages exchanged during the interaction. We denote by view P V (x) a random variable describing the content of the random tape of V and the transcript of the concurrent interaction between P and V (that is, all messages that V sends and receives during the concurrent interactions with P, on common input x).
Remark: The actual de nition of concurrent zero-knowledge requires that the concurrent adversary V explicitly speci es to which session the next scheduled message belongs. However, in the proof of Theorem 1.1 we consider a \weaker" concurrent adversary V , that is only running a xed scheduling of sessions (and so does not determine the schedule dynamically). In particular, there will be no need to use a formalism for specifying to which session the next scheduled message belongs.
De nition 2.2 (Concurrent Zero-Knowledge) Let hP; V i be an interactive proof system for a language L. We say that hP; V i is concurrent zero-knowledge, if for every polynomial-time concurrent adversary V there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm S V such that the ensembles fview P V (x)g x2L and fS V (x)g x2L are computationally indistinguishable.
Black-box concurrent zero-knowledge
Loosely speaking, the de nition of black-box zero-knowledge requires that there exists a \universal" simulator, S, so that for every x 2 L and every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary V , the simulator S produces a distribution that is indistinguishable from view P V (x) while using V as an oracle (i.e., in a \black-box" manner). We assume concurrent adversaries V are modeled by polysized circuits (capturing non-uniform, deterministic veri ers viewed as an oracle, cf. 18, 16, 26] ). Before we proceed with the formal de nition, we will have to overcome a technical di culty arising from an inherent di erence between the concurrent setting and \stand-alone" setting. In \stand-alone" zero-knowledge the length of the output of the simulator depends only on the protocol and the size of the common input x. It is thus reasonable to require that the simulator runs in time that depends only on the size of x, regardless of the running time of its black-box. However, in black-box concurrent zero-knowledge the output of the simulator is an entire schedule, and its length depends on the running time of the concurrent adversary. Therefore, if we naively require that the running time of the simulator is a xed polynomial in the size of x, then we end up with an unsatis able de nition. (As for any simulator S there is an adversary V that generates a transcript that is longer than the running time of S.)
One way to solve the above problem is to have for each xed polynomial q( ), a simulator S q that \only" simulates all q( )-sized circuits V . Clearly, the running time of the simulator now depends on the running time of V (which is an upper bound on the size of the schedule), and the above problem does not occur anymore. Another (more restrictive) way to overcome the above problem would be to consider a simulator S q that "only" simulates all adversaries V which run at most q(jxj) sessions during their execution (we stress that q( ) is chosen after the protocol is determined). Such simulators should run in worst-case time that is a xed polynomial in q(jxj) and in the size of the common input x. (Note that by letting S q "know" q( ) in advance we actually strengthen the lower bound.) In the sequel we choose to adopt the latter formalization. We stress that both formalizations are general enough to include all known black-box zero-knowledge proofs.
De nition 2.3 (Black-Box Concurrent Zero-Knowledge) Let hP; V i be an interactive proof system for a language L. We say that hP; V i is black-box concurrent zero-knowledge, if for ev-
Additional conventions
Deviation gap and expected polynomial-time simulators: The deviation gap of a simulator S for a proof-system hP; V i is de ned, somewhat informally, as follows. Consider a distinguisher D that is required to decide whether its input consists of view P V (x) or to the transcript that was produced by S. The deviation gap of D is the di erence between the probability that D outputs 1 given an output of S, and the probability that D outputs 1 given view P V (x). The deviation gap of S is the deviation gap of the best polynomial time distinguisher D. In our de nitions of concurrent zero-knowledge (De nitions 2.2 and 2.3) the deviation gap of the simulator is required to be negligible in jxj.
For our lower bound, we allow simulators that run in strict (worst case) polynomial time, and have deviation gap at most 1=4. As for expected polynomial time simulators, one can use a standard argument to show that any simulator running in expected polynomial time, and having deviation gap at most 1=8 can be transformed into a simulator that runs in strict (worst case) polynomial time, and has deviation gap at most 1=4. In particular, our lower bound (on simulators that run in strict polynomial time, and have deviation gap at most 1=4) extends to a lower bound on simulators running in expected polynomial time (and have deviation gap as large as 1=8).
Query conventions: By k-round protocols we mean protocols in which 2k + 2 messages are exchanged subject to the following conventions. The rst message is a xed initiation message by the veri er, denoted v 1 , which is answered by the prover's rst message denoted p 1 . The following veri er and prover messages are denoted v 2 ; p 2 ; : : : ; v k+1 ; p k+1 , where v k+1 is an ACCEPT/REJECT message indicating whether the veri er has accepted its input, and the last message (i.e., p k+1 ) is a xed acknowledgment message sent by the prover. 4 Clearly, any protocol in which 2k messages are exchanged can be modi ed to t this form (by adding at most two messages).
We impose the following technical restrictions on the simulator (but claim that each of these restrictions can be easily satis ed): As in (cf. 18]), the queries of the simulator are pre xes of possible execution transcripts (in the concurrent setting). 5 Such a pre x is a sequence of alternating prover and veri er messages (which may belong to di erent sessions as determined by the xed schedule) that ends with a prover message. The answer to the queries made by the simulator consists of a single veri er message (which belongs to the next scheduled session). We assume that the simulator never repeats the same query twice. In addition, we assume that before making a query q = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b t ; a t ), where the a's are prover messages, the simulator has made queries to all relevant pre xes (i.e., (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b i ; a i ), for every i < t), and has obtained the b i 's as answers. Finally, we assume that before producing output (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b T ; a T ), the simulator makes the query (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b T ; a T ).
Proof outline
This section contains an outline of the proof of Theorem 1.1. The actual proof will be given in Sections 4 and 5. To facilitate reading, we partition the outline into two parts: The rst part reviews the general framework. (This part mainly follows previous works, namely 17, 26, 29] .) The second part concentrates on the actual schedule and the speci cs of our lower bound argument.
The high-level framework
Consider a k-round Concurrent Zero Knowledge proof system hP; V i for language L, and let S be a black-box simulator for hP; V i. We use S to construct a BPP decision procedure for L. For this purpose, we construct a family fV h g of \cheating veri ers". To decide on an input x, run S with a cheating veri er V h that was chosen at random from the constructed family, and decide that x 2 L i S outputs an accepting transcript of V h .
The general structure of the family fV h g is roughly as follows. A member V h in the family is identi ed via a hash function h taken from a hash-function family H having \much randomness" (or high independence). Speci cally, the independence of H will be larger than the running time of S. This guarantees that, for our purposes, a function drawn randomly from H behaves like a random function. We de ne some xed concurrent schedule of a number of sessions between V h and the prover. In each session, V h runs the code of the honest veri er V on input x and random input h(a), where a is the current history of the (multi-session) interaction at the point where the session starts. V h accepts if all the copies of V accept.
The proof of validity of the decision procedure is structured as follows. Say that S succeeds if it outputs an accepting transcript of V h . It is rst claimed that if x 2 L then a valid simulator S must succeed with high probability. Roughly speaking, this is so because each session behaves like the original proof system hP; V i, and hP; V i accepts x with high probability. Demonstrating that the simulator almost never succeeds when x = 2 L is much more involved. Given S we construct a \cheating prover" P that makes the honest veri er V accept x with probability that is polynomially related to the success probability of S. The soundness of hP; V i now implies that in this case S succeeds only with negligible probability. See details below.
Session-pre xes and useful session-pre xes
In order to complete the high-level description of the proof, we must rst de ne the following notions that play a central role in the analysis. Consider the conversation between V h and a prover. A session-pre x a is a pre x of this conversation that ends at the point where some new session starts (including the rst veri er message in that session). (Recall that V 's random input for that new session is set to h(a).) Next, consider the conversation between S and V h in some run of S. (Such a conversation may contain many interleaved and incomplete conversations of V h with a prover.) Roughly speaking, a message sent by S to the simulated V h is said to have session pre x a if it relates to the session where the veri er randomness is h(a). A session-pre x a is called useful in a run of S if: 1. It was accepted (i.e., V h sent an ACCEPT message for session-pre x a). 2. V h has sent exactly k + 1 messages for session-pre x a. Loosely speaking, Condition 2 implies that S did not rewind the relevant session-pre x, where rewind session-pre x a is an informal term meaning that S rewinds V h to a point where V h provides a second continuation for session-pre x a. By rewinding session-pre x a, the simulator is able to obtain more than k+1 veri er messages for session-pre x a. This is contrast to an actual execution of the protocol hP; V i in which V sends exactly k + 1 messages.
The construction of the cheating prover
Using the above terms, we sketch the construction of the cheating prover P . It rst randomly chooses a function h r H and an index (of a session-pre x) i. It then emulates an interaction between S and V h , with the exception that P uses the messages sent by S that have the i th session-pre x as the messages that P sends to the actual veri er it interacts with; similarly, it uses the messages received from the actual veri er V instead of V h 's messages in the i th session-pre x. The strategy of the cheating prover is depicted in Figure 1 3.1.3 The success probability of the cheating prover We next claim that if the session-pre x chosen by P is useful, then hP ; V i(x) accepts. The key point is that whenever P chooses an useful session-pre x, the following two conditions (corresponding to the two conditions in the de nition of a useful session-pre x) are satis ed: 1. The session corresponding to the i th session-pre x is accepted by V h (and so by V ).
2. P manages to reach the end of the hP ; V i interaction without "getting into trouble". 6 Loosely speaking Item (1) is implied by Condition (1) in the de nition of a useful session-pre x. As for Item (2) , this just follows from the fact that S does not rewind the i th session-pre x (as implied by Condition (2) in the de nition of a useful session-pre x). In particular, P (playing the role of V h ) will not have to send the j th veri er message with the i th session-pre x more than once to S (since the number of messages sent by V h for that session-pre x is precisely k + 1).
Since the number of session-pre xes in an execution of S is bounded by a polynomial, it follows that if the conversation between S and V h contains a useful session-pre x with non-negligible probability, then hP ; V i(x) accepts with non-negligible probability.
The schedule and additional ideas
Using the above framework, the crux of the lower bound is to come up with a schedule and V h 's that allow demonstrating that whenever S succeeds, the conversation between S and V h contains a useful session-pre x (as we have argued above, it is in fact su cient that the conversation between S and V h contains a useful session-pre x with non-negligible probability). This is done next.
The 2-round case
Our starting point is the schedule used in 26] to demonstrate the impossibility of black-box concurrent zero-knowledge with protocols in which 4 messages are exchanged (i.e., v 1 ; p 1 ; v 2 ; p 2 ). The schedule is recursive and consists of n concurrent sessions (n is polynomially related to the security parameter). Given parameter m n, the scheduling on m sessions (denoted R m ) proceeds as follows (see Figure 2 for Suppose now that S suceeds in simulating the above V h but the conversation between S and V h does not contain a useful session-pre x. Since V h proceeds beyond the ending point of a session only if this session is accepted, then the only reason for which the corresponding session-pre x can be non-useful is because S has rewound that session-pre x. Put in other words, a session-pre x becomes non-useful if and only if S resends the rst prover message in the protocol (i.e., p 1 ). 7 This shuld cause V h to resend the second veri er message (i.e., v 2 ), thus violating Condition (2) in the de nition of a useful session-pre x (see Section 3.1.1).
The key observation is that whenever the rst prover message in the`t h session is modi ed, then so is the session-pre x of the s th session for all s >`. Thus, whenever S resends the rst prover message in the`t h session, it must do so also in the s th session for all s >`(since otherwise the "fresh" session-pre x of the s th session, that is induced by resending the above message, will be useful). But The crucial problem of the above schedule is that one can come up with a k-round protocol and a corresponding simulator that manages to succesfully simulate V h and cause all session-pre xes in its conversation with V h to be non-useful. Speci cally, there exist protocols (cf. 28]) in which the simulator is required to successfully rewind an honestly behaving veri er exactly once for every session. Whereas in the case of 2-rounds this could have had devastating consequences (since, in the case of the previous schedule, it would have implied W(m) (k +1) W(m?1) = 2 W(m?1), which solves to W(n) 2 n?1 ), in the general case (i.e., when k + 1 > 2) any rewinding of the schedule that we have suggested would have forced the simulator to re-invest simulation "work" only for m?1 k sessions. Note that such a simulator satis es W(m) = (k + 1) W( m?1 k ), which solves to k O(log k n) = n O (1) . In particular, by investing polynomial amount of work the simulator is able to make all session-pre xes not useful while succesfully simulating all sessions.
The k-round case { second attempt
One method to circumvent this di culty was used in 29]. However, that method extends the lower bound only up to 3 rounds (more precisely, 7 messages). Here we use a di erent method. What we do is let the cheating veri er abort (i.e., refuse to answer) every message in the schedule with some predetermined probability (independently of other messages). To do this, we rst add another, binary hash function, g, to the speci cation of V h . This hash function is taken from a family G with su cient independence, so that it looks like a random binary function. Now, before generating the next message in some session, V g;h rst applies g to some predetermined part of the conversation so far. If g returns 0 then V g;h aborts the session by sending an ABORT message. If g returns 1 then V g;h is run as usual.
The rationale behind the use of aborts can be explained as follows. Recall that a session-pre x a stops being useful only when V g;h sends more than k messages whose session-pre x is a. This means that a stops being useful only if S rewinds the session-pre x a and in addition g returns 1 in at least two of the continuations of a. This means that S is expected to rewind session-pre x a several times before it stops being useful. Since each rewinding of a involves extra work of S on higher-level sessions, this may force S to invest considerably more work before a session stops being useful.
A bit more speci cally, let p denote the probability, taken over the choice of g, that g returns 1 on a given input. In each attempt, the session is not aborted with probability p. Thus S is expected to rewind a session pre x 1=p times before it becomes non-useful. This gives hope that, in order to make sure that no session-pre x is useful, S must do work that satis es a condition of the sort:
This would mean that the work required to successfully simulate n sessions and make all sessionpre xes non-useful is at least (p ?log k n ). Consequently, when the expression p ?log k n is superpolynomial there is hope that the conversation between S and V h contains a useful session-pre x with non-negligible probability.
The k-round case { nal version
However, demonstrating Eq. (1) brings up the following di culty. Once the veri er starts aborting sessions, the probability that a session is ever completed may become too small. As a consequence, it is not clear anymore that the simulator must invest simulation "work" for all sessions in the schedule. It may very well be the case that the simulator will go about the simulation task while "avoiding" part of the simulation "work" in some recursive invocations (as some of these invocations may be aborted anyway during the simulation). In other words, there is no guarantee that the recursive "work" invested by the simulator behaves like Eq. (1).
To overcome this problem, we replace each session in the above schedule (for k rounds) with a \block" of, say, n sessions (see Figure 4 in Page 15). We now have n 2 sessions in a schedule. (This choice of parameters is arbitrary, and is made for convenience of presentation.) V g;h accepts a block of n sessions if at least 1/2 of the non-aborted sessions in this block were accepted and not too many of the sessions in this block were aborted. Once a block is rejected, V g;h halts. At the end of the execution, V g;h accepts if all blocks were accepted. The above modi cation guarantees us that, by a careful setting of the parameters, the simulator's recursive "work" must satisfy Eq. (1), at least with overwhelming probability.
Setting the value of p
Once Eq. (1) is established, it remains to set the value of p. Clearly, the smaller p is chosen to be, the larger p ?log k n is. However, p cannot be too small, or else the probability of a session to be ever completed will be too small, and Condition (1) in the de nition of a useful session-pre x (Section 3.1.1) will not be satis ed. Speci cally, a k-round protocol is completed with probability p k . We thus have to make sure that p k is not negligible (and furthermore that p k n 1).
In the proof we set p = n ?1=2k . This will guarantee that a session is completed with probability p k = n ?1=2 (thus Condition (1) has hope to be satis ed). Furthermore, since p ?log k n is superpolynomial whenever k = o(log n= log log n), there is hope that Condition (2) in the de nition of a useful session-pre x (Section 3.1.1) will be satis ed for k = o(log n= log log n).
The actual analysis
Demonstrating that there exist many accepted session-pre xes is straightforward. Demonstrating that one of these session-pre xes is useful requires arguing on the dependency between the expected work done by the simulator and its success probability. This is a tricky business, since the choices made by the simulator (and in particular the amount of e ort spent on making each session nonuseful) may depend on past events. We go about this task by pinpointing a special (combinatorial) property that holds for any successful run of the simulator, unless the simulator runs in super-polynomial time (Lemma 5.9). Essentially, this property states that there exists a block of sessions such that none of the sessionpre xes in this block were rewound too many times. Using this property, we show (in Lemma 5.7) that the probability (over the choices of V g;h and the simulator) that a run of the simulator contains no useful session-pre x is negligible. 4 The Actual Proof (of Theorem 1.1)
Assuming towards the contradiction that a black-box simulator, denoted S, contradicting Theorem 1.1 exists, we will describe a probabilistic polynomial-time decision procedure for L, based on S. The rst step towards describing the decision procedure for L involves the construction of an adversary veri er in the concurrent model. This is done next.
The concurrent adversarial veri er
The description of the adversarial strategy proceeds in several steps. We start by describing the underlying xed schedule of messages. Once the schedule is presented, we describe the adversary's strategy regarding the contents of the veri er messages.
The schedule
For each x 2 f0; 1g n , we consider the following concurrent scheduling of n 2 sessions, all run on common input x. 8 The scheduling is de ned recursively, where the scheduling of m n 2 sessions (denoted R m ) proceeds as follows: 9 1. If m n, sessions 1; : : : ; m are executed sequentially until they are all completed; 2. Otherwise, for j = 1; : : : ; k + 1:
Message exchange: Each of the rst n sessions exchanges two messages (i.e., v j ; p j );
(These rst n sessions out of f1; : : : ; mg will be referred to as the main sessions of R m .) Recursive call: If j < k + 1, the scheduling is applied recursively on b m?n k c new sessions; (This is done using the next b m?n k c remaining sessions out of 1; : : : ; m.)
The schedule is depicted in Figure 4 . We stress that the veri er typically postpones its answer (i.e., v j ) to the last prover's message (i.e., p j?1 ) till after a recursive sub-schedule is executed, and that in the j th iteration of Step 2, b m?n k c new sessions are initiated (with the exception of the rst iteration, in which the rst n (main) sessions are initiated as well). The order in which the messages of various sessions are exchanged (in the rst part of Step 2) is xed but immaterial. Say that we let the rst session proceed, then the second and so on. That is, we have the order v (1) j ; p (1) j ; : : : ; v (n) j ; p (n) j , where v (i) j (resp., p (i) j ) denotes the veri er's (resp., prover's) j th message in the i th session.
The set of n sessions that are explicitly executed during the message exchange phase of the recursive invocation (i.e., the main sessions) is called a recursive block. (Notice that each recursive block corresponds to exactly one recursive invocation of the schedule.) Taking a closer look at the schedule we observe that every session in the schedule is explicitly executed in exactly one recursive invocation (that is, belongs to exactly one recursive block). Since the total number of sessions in the schedule is n 2 , and since the message exchange phase in each recursive invocation involves the explicit execution of n sessions (in other words, the size of each recursive block is n), we have that the total number of recursive blocks in the schedule equals n. Since each recursive invocation of the schedule involves the invocation of k additional sub-schedules, the recursion actually corresponds to a k-ary tree with n nodes. The depth of the recursion is thus blog k ((k ? 1)n + 1)c, and the number of \leaves" in the recursion (i.e., sub-schedules of size at most n) is at least b (k?1)n+1 k c. Identifying sessions according to their recursive block: To simplify the exposition of the proof, it will be convenient to associate every session appearing in the schedule with a pair of indices (`; i) 2 f1; : : : ; ng f1; : : : ; ng, rather than with a single index s 2 f1; : : : ; n 2 g. The value of`=`(s) 2 f1; : : : ; ng will represent the index of the recursive block to which session s belongs (according to some canonical enumeration of the n invocations in the recursive schedule, say according to the order in which they are invoked), whereas the value of i = i(s) 2 f1; : : : ; ng will represent the index of session s within the n sessions that belong to the`t h recursive block (in other words, session (`; i) is the i th main session of the`t h recursive invocation in the schedule). Typically, when we explicitly refer to messages of session (`; i), the index of the corresponding recursive block (i.e.,`) is easily deducible from the context. In such cases, we will sometimes omit the index`from the \natural" notation v (`;i) j (resp. p (`;i) j ), and stick to the notation v (i) j (resp. p (i) j ). Note that the values of (`; i) and the session index s are completely interchangeable (in particular, = s div n and i = s mod n).
De nition 4.1 (Identi ers of next message) The schedule de nes a mapping from partial execution transcripts ending with a prover message to the identi ers of the next veri er message; that is, the session and round number to which the next veri er message belongs. (Recall that such partial execution transcripts correspond to queries of a black-box simulator and so the mapping de nes the identi er of the answer:) For such a query q = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b t ; a t ), we denote by sn (q) = (`; i) 2 f1; : : : ; ng f1; : : : ; ng the session to which the next veri er message belongs, and by msg (q) = j 2 f1; : : : ; k + 1g its index within the veri er's messages in this session.
We stress that the identi ers of the next message are uniquely determined by the number of messages appearing in the query (and are not a ected by the contents of these messages). 
Towards constructing an adversarial veri er
Once the identi ers of the next veri er message are deduced from the query's length, one has to specify a strategy according to which the contents of the next veri er message will be determined. Loosely speaking, our adversary veri er has two options: It will either send the answer that would have been sent by an honest veri er (given the messages in the query that are relevant to the current session), or it will choose to deviate from the honest veri er strategy and abort the interaction in the current session (this will be done by answering with a special ABORT message). Since in a non-trivial zero-knowledge proof system the honest veri er is always probabilistic (cf. 20]), and since the \abort behaviour" of the adversary veri er should be \unpredictable" for the simulator, we have that both options require a source of randomness (either for computing the contents of the honest veri er answer or for deciding whether to abort the conversation). As is already customary in works of this sort 18, 26, 29], we let the source of randomness be a hash function with su ciently high independence (which is \hard-wired" into the veri er's description), and consider the execution of a black-box simulator that is given access to such a random veri er.
(Recall that the simulator's queries correspond to partial execution transcripts and thus contain the whole history of the interaction so far.)
Determining the randomness for a session: Focusing ( rst) on the randomness required to compute the honest veri er's answers, we ask what should the input of the above hash function be. A naive solution would be to let the randomness for a session depend on the session's index. That is, to obtain randomness for session (`; i) = sn (q) apply the hash function on the value (`; i). This solution will indeed imply that every two sessions have independent randomness (as the hash function will have di erent inputs). However, the solution seems to fail to capture the di culty arising in the simulation (of multiple concurrent sessions). What we would like to have is a situation in which whenever the simulator rewinds a session (that is, feeds the adversary veri er with a di erent query of the same length), it causes the randomness of some other session (say, one level down in the recursive schedule) to be completely modi ed. To achieve this, we must cause the randomness of a session to depend also on the history of the entire interaction. Changing even a single message in this history would immediately result in an unrelated instance of the current session, and would thus force the simulator to redo the simulation work on this session all over again. So where in the schedule should the randomness of session (`; i) be determined? On the one hand, we would like to determine the randomness of a session as late as possible (in order to maximize the e ect of changes in the history of the interaction on the randomness of the session). On the other hand, we cannot a ord to determine the randomness after the session's initiating message is scheduled (since the protocol's speci cation may require that the veri er's randomness is completely determined before the rst veri er message is sent). For technical reasons, the point in which we choose to determine the randomness of session (`; i) is the point in which recursive block number`is invoked. That is, to obtain the randomness of session (`; i) = sn (q) we feed the hash function with the pre x of query q that ends just before the rst message in block number`(this pre x is called the block-pre x of query q and is de ned below). In order to achieve independence with other sessions in block number`, we will also feed the hash function with the value of i. This (together with the above choice) guarantees us the following properties: (1) The input to the hash function (and thus the randomness for session (`; i)) does not change once the interaction in the session begins (that is, once the rst veri er message is sent). (2) For every pair of di erent sessions, the input to the hash function is di erent (and thus the randomness for each session is independent). (3) Even a single modi cation in the pre x of the interaction up to the rst message in block number`, induces fresh randomness for all sessions in block number`.
De nition 4.2 (Block-pre x) The block-pre x of a query q satisfying sn (q) = (`; i), is the pre x of q that is answered with the rst veri er message of session (`; 1) (that is, the rst main session in block number`). More formally, bp(q) = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b ; a ) is the block-pre x of q = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b t ; a t ) if sn (bp(q)) = (`; 1) and msg (bp(q)) = 1. The block-pre x will be said to correspond to recursive block number`. 10 (Note that i may be any index in f1; : : : ; ng, and that a t need not belong to session (`; i).)
Determining whether and when to abort sessions: Whereas the randomness that is used to compute the honest veri er's answers in each session is determined before a session begins, the randomness that is used in order to decide whether to abort a session is chosen independently every time the execution of the schedule reaches the next veri er message in this session. As before, the required randomness is obtained by applying a hash function on the suitable pre x of the execution transcript. This time, however, the length of the pre x increases each time the execution of the session reaches the next veri er message (rather than being xed for the whole execution of the session). This way, the decision of whether to abort a session also depends on the contents of messages that were exchanged after the initiation of the session has occurred. Speci cally, in order to decide whether to abort session (`; i) = sn (q) at the j th message (where j = msg (q)), we feed the hash function with the pre x (of query q) that ends with the (j?1) st prover message in the n th main session of block number`. (As before, the hash function is also fed with the value of i (in order to achieve independence from other sessions in the block).) This pre x is called the iterationpre x of query q and is de ned next (see Figure 5 for a graphical description of the block-pre x and iteration-pre x of a query).
De nition 4.3 (Iteration-pre x) The iteration-pre x of a query q satisfying sn (q) = (`; i) and msg (q) = j > 1, is the pre x of q that ends with the (j?1) st prover message in session (`; n) (that is, the n th main session in block number`). More formally, ip(q) = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b ; a ) is the iterationpre x of q = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b t ; a t ) if a is of the form p (n) j?1 (where p (n) j?1 denotes the (j ?1) st prover message in the n th main session of block number`). This iteration-pre x is said to correspond to the block-pre x of q. (Again, note that i may be any index in f1; : : : ; ng, and that a t need not belong to session (`; i). Also, note that the iteration-pre x is de ned only for msg (q) > 1.)
We stress that two queries q 1 ; q 2 may have the same iteration-pre x even if they do not correspond to the same session. This could happen whenever bp(q 1 ) = bp(q 2 ) and msg (q 1 ) = msg (q 2 ) (which is possible even if sn (q 1 ) 6 = sn (q 2 )).
Motivating De nitions 4.2 and 4.3: The choices made in De nitions 4.2 and 4.3 are designed
to capture the di culties encountered whenever many sessions are to be simulated concurrently.
As was previously mentioned, we would like to create a situation in which every attempt of the simulator to rewind a speci c session will result in loss of work done for other sessions (and so will cause the simulator to do the same amount of work all over again). In order to force the simulator to repeat each such rewinding attempt many times, we make each rewinding attempt fail with some predetermined probability (by letting the veri er send an ABORT message instead of a legal answer Figure 5 : Determining the pre xes of query q (in this example, query q ends with a p (1) j message and is to be answered by v (2) j , represented by the marked arrow): (a) indicates the block-pre x of q (i.e., messages up to this point are used by V g;h to determine the randomness to be used for computing message v (2) j ). (b) indicates the iteration-pre x of q (i.e., messages up to this point are used by V g;h to determine whether or not message v (2) j will be set to ABORT).
To see that De nitions 4.2 and 4.3 indeed lead to the ful llment of the above requirements, we consider the following example. Suppose that at some point during the simulation, the adversary veri er aborts session (`; i) at the j th message (while answering query q). Further suppose that (for some unspeci ed reason) the simulator wants to to get a \second chance" in receiving a legal answer to the j th message in session (`; i) (hoping that it will not receive the ABORT message again). Recall that the decision of whether to abort a session depends on the outcome of a hash function when applied to the iteration-pre x ip(q), of query q. In particular, to obtain a \second chance", the black-box simulator has no choice but to change at least one prover message in the above iterationpre x (in other words, the simulator must rewind the interaction to some message occurring in iteration-pre x ip(q)). At rst glance it may seem that the e ect of changes in the iteration-pre x of query q is con ned to the messages that belong to session (`; i) = sn (q) (or at most, to messages that belong to other sessions in block number`). However, taking a closer look at the schedule, we observe that every iteration-pre x (and in particular ip(q)) can also be viewed as the block-pre x of a recursive block one level down in the recursive construction. Viewed this way, it is clear that the e ect of changes in ip(q) is not con ned only to messages that correspond to recursive block number , but rather extends also to sessions at lower levels in the recursive schedule. By changing even a single message in iteration-pre x ip(q), the simulator is actually modifying the block-pre x of all recursive blocks in a sub-schedule one level down in the recursive construction. This means that the randomness for all sessions in these blocks is completely modi ed (recall that the randomness of a session is determined by applying a hash function on the corresponding block-pre x), and that all the simulation work done for these sessions is lost. In particular, by changing even a single message in iteration-pre x ip(q), the simulator will nd himself doing the simulation work for these lower-level sessions all over again.
Having established the e ect of changes in iteration-pre x ip(q) on sessions at lower levels in the recursive schedule, we now turn to examine the actual e ect on session (`; i) = sn (q) itself. One possible consequence of changes in iteration-pre x ip(q) is that they may also e ect the contents of the block-pre x bp(q) of query q (notice that, by de nition, the block-pre x bp(q) of query q is contained in the iteration-pre x ip(q) of query q). Whenever this happens, the randomness used for session (`; i) is completely modi ed, and all simulation work done for this session will be lost. A more interesting consequence of a change in the contents of iteration-pre x ip(q), is that it will result in a completely independent decision of whether session (`; i) is to be aborted at the j th message (the decision of whether to abort is taken whenever the simulator makes a query q satisfying sn (q) = (`; i), and msg (q) = j). In other words, each time the simulator attempts to get a \second chance" in receiving a legal answer to the j th message in session (`; i) (by rewinding the interaction to a message that belongs to iteration-pre x ip(q)), it faces the risk of being answered with an ABORT message independently of all previous rewinding attempts.
The actual veri er strategy V g;h
We consider what happens when a simulator S (for the above schedule) is given oracle access to a veri er strategy V g;h de ned as follows (depending on hash functions g; h and the input x). Recall that we may assume that S runs in strict polynomial time: we denote such time bound by t S ( ). Let G denote a small family of t S (n)-wise independent hash functions mapping poly(n)-bit long sequences into a single bit of output, so that for every we have Pr g G g( ) = 1] = n ?1=2k . Let H denote a small family of t S (n)-wise independent hash functions mapping poly(n)-bit long sequences to V (n)-bit sequences, so that for every we have Pr h H h( ) = 1] = 2 ? V (n) (where V (n) is the number of random bits used by an honest veri er V on an input x 2 f0; 1g n ). 12 We describe a family fV g;h g g2G;h2H of adversarial veri er strategies (where x is implicit in V g;h ). On query q = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; a t?1 ; b t ; a t ), the veri er acts as follows:
1. First, V g;h checks if the execution transcript given by the query is legal (i.e., corresponds to a possible execution pre x), and halts with a special ERROR message if the query is not legal. 13 The value of the block-pre x, bp(q), is used in order to determine the randomness of session (`; i), whereas the value of the iteration-pre x, ip(q), is used in order to determine whether session (`; i) is about to be aborted at this point (i.e., j th message) in the schedule (by answering with a special ABORT message).)
3. If j = 1, then V g;h answers with the veri er's xed initiation message for session i (i.e., v (i) 1 ). 12 We stress that functions in such families can be described by strings of polynomial length in a way that enables polynomial time evaluation (cf. 24, 9, 10, 1]). 13 In particular, V g;h checks whether the query is of the prescribed format (as described in Section 2.5, and as determined by the schedule), and that the contents of its messages is consistent with V g;h 's prior answers. (That is, for every proper pre x q 0 = (b1; a1; : : : ; bu; au) of query q = (b1; a1; : : : ; bt; at), the veri er checks whether the value of bu+1 (as it appears in q) is indeed equal to the value of V g;h (q 0 ).) 4 . If j > 1, then V g;h determines b i;j = g(i; ip(q)) (i.e., a bit deciding whether to abort session i): Dealing with ABORT messages: Note that, once V g;h has aborted a session, the interaction in this session essentially stops, and there is no need to continue exchanging messages in this session. However, for simplicity of exposition we assume that the veri er and prover stick to the xed schedule of Section 4.1.1 and exchange ABORT messages whenever an aborted session is scheduled. Speci cally, if the j th veri er message in session i is ABORT then all subsequent prover and veri er messages in that session will also equal ABORT.
On the arguments to g and h: The hash function h, which determines the random input for V in a session, is applied both on i (the identi er of the relevant session within the current block) and on the entire block-pre x of the query q. This means that even though all sessions in a speci c block have the same block-pre x, for every pair of two di erent sessions, the corresponding random inputs of V will be independent of each other (as long as the number of applications of h does not exceed t S (n), which is indeed the case in our application). The hash function g, which determines whether and when the veri er aborts sessions, is applied both on i and on the entire iteration-pre x of the query q. As in the case of h, the decision whether to abort a session is independent from the same decision for other sessions (again, as long as g is not applied more than t S (n) times). However, there is a signi cant di erence between the inputs of h and g: Whereas the input of h is xed once i and the block-pre x are xed (and is une ected by mesages that belong to that session), the input of g varies depending on previous messages sent in that session. In particular, whereas the randomness of a session is completely determined once the session begins, the decision of whether to abort a session is taken independently each time that the schedule reaches the next veri er message of this session.
On the number of di erent pre xes that occur in interactions with V g;h : Since the number of recursive blocks in the schedule is equal to n, and since there is a one-to-one correspondence between recursive blocks and block-pre xes, we have that the number of di erent block-pre xes that occur during an interaction between an honest prover P and the veri er V g;h is always equal to n. Since the number of iterations in the message exchange phase of a recursive invocation of the schedule equals k + 1, and since there is a one-to-one correspondence between such iterations and iteration-pre xes 14 we have that the number of di erent iteration-pre xes that occur during an interaction between and honest prover P and the veri er V g;h , is always equal to k n (that is, k di erent iteration-pre xes for each one of the n recursive invocations of the schedule). In contrast, the number of di erent block-pre xes (resp., iteration-pre xes), that occur during an execution of a black-box simulator S that is given oracle access to V g;h , may be considerably larger than n (resp., k n). The reason for this is that there is nothing that prevents the simulator from feeding V g;h with di erent queries of the same length (this corresponds to the so called rewinding of an interaction). Still, the number of di erent pre xes in an execution of S is always upper bounded by the running time of S; that is, t S (n).
On the probability that a session is never aborted: A typical interaction between an honest prover P and the veri er V g;h will contain sessions whose execution has been aborted prior to completion. Recall that at each point in the schedule, the decision of whether or not to abort the next scheduled session depends on the outcome of g. Since the function g returns 1 with probability n ?1=2k , a speci c session is never aborted with probability (n ?1=2k ) k = n ?1=2 . Using the fact that whenever a session is not aborted, V g;h operates as the honest veri er, we infer that the probability that a speci c session is eventually accepted by V g;h is at least 1=2 times the probability that the very same session is never aborted (where 1=2 is an arbitrary lower bound on the completeness probability of the protocol). In other words, the probability that a session is accepted by V g;h is at least n ?1=2 2 . In particular, for every set of n sessions, the expected number of sessions that are eventually accepted by V g;h (when interacting with the honest prover P) is at least n n ?1=2 2 = n 1=2 2 , and with overwhelming high probability at least n 1=2 4 sessions are accepted by V g;h .
A slight modi cation of the veri er strategy: To facilitate the analysis, we slightly modify the veri er strategy V g;h so that it does not allow the number of accepted sessions in the history of the interaction to deviate much from its \expected behavior". Loosely speaking, given a pre x of the execution transcript (ending with a prover message), the veri er will check whether the recursive block that has just been completed contains at least n 1=2 4 accepted sessions. (To this end, it will be su cient to inspect the history of the interaction only when the execution of the schedule reaches the end of a recursive block. That is, whenever the schedule reaches the last prover message in the last session of a recursive block (i.e., some p (n) k+1 message).) The modi ed veri er strategy (which we continue to denote by V g;h ), is obtained by adding to the original strategy an additional
Step 1' (to be executed after Step 1 of V g;h ): 1'. If a t is of the form p (n) k+1 (i.e., in case query q = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b t ; a t ) ends with the last prover message of the n th main session of a recursive block), V g;h checks whether the transcript q = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b t ; p (n) k+1 ) contains the accepting conversations of at least n 1=2 4 main sessions in the block that has just been completed. In case it does not, V g;h halts with a special DEVIATION message (indicating that the number of accepted sessions in the block that has just been completed deviates from its expected value).
Motivating discussion: Since the expected number of accepted sessions in a speci c block is at least n 1=2 2 , the probability that the block contains less than n 1=2 4 accepted sessions is negligible. Still, the above modi cation is not super uous (even though it refers to events that occur only with negligible probability): It allows us to assume that every recursive block that is completed during the simulation (including those that do not appear in the simulator's output) contains at least n 1=2 4 accepted sessions. In particular, whenever the simulator feeds V g;h with a partial execution transcript (i.e., a query), we are guaranteed that for every completed block in this transcript, the simulator has indeed \invested work" to simulate the at least n 1=2 4 accepted sessions in the block.
A slight modi cation of the simulator: Before presenting the decision procedure, we slightly modify the simulator so that it never makes a query that is answered with either the ERROR or DEVIATION messages by the veri er V g;h . Note that the corresponding condition can be easily checked by the simulator (which can easily produce this special message by itself), 15 and that the modi cation does not e ect the simulator's output. From this point on, when we talk of the simulator (which we continue to denote by S) we mean the modi ed one.
The decision procedure for L
We are now ready to describe a probabilistic polynomial-time decision procedure for L, based on the black-box simulator S and the veri er strategies V g;h . On input x 2 f0; 1g n , the procedure operates as follows: 1. Uniformly select hash functions g r G and h r H. 2. Invoke S on input x providing it black-box access to V g;h (as de ned above). That is, the procedure emulates the execution of the oracle machine S on input x along with emulating the answers of V g;h , where g and h are as determined in Step 1. 3. Accept if and only if S outputs a legal transcript (as determined by Steps 1 and 1' of V g;h ). 16 By our hypothesis, the above procedure runs in probabilistic polynomial-time. We next analyze its performance.
Lemma 4.4 (performance on yes-instances): For all but nitely many x 2 L, the above procedure accepts x with probability at least 2=3.
Proof Sketch: Let x 2 L, g r G, h r H, and consider the honest prover P. We show below that, except for negligible probability (where the probability is taken over the random choices of g, h, and P's coin tosses), when V g;h interacts with P, all recursive blocks in the resulting transcript contain the accepting conversations of at least n 1=2 4 main sessions. Since for every g and h the simulator S V g;h (x) must generate a transcript whose deviation gap from hP; V g;h i(x) is at most 1=4, it follows that S V g;h (x) has deviation gap at most 1=4 from hP; V g;h i(x) also when g r G and h r H. Consequently, when S is run by the decision procedure for L, the transcript S V g;h (x) will not be legal with probability at most 1=3. Details follow.
Let denote the random variable describing the transcript of the interaction between the honest prover P and V g;h , where the probability is taken over the choices of g, h, and P. Let s 2 f1; : : : ; n 2 g.
We rst calculate the probability that the s th session in is completed and accepted (i.e., V g;h sends the message v (s) k+1 = ACCEPT), conditioned on the event that V g;h did not abandon the interaction beforehand (i.e., V g;h did not send the DEVIATION message before). 17 For uniformly selected g r G, the probability that V g;h does not abort the session in each of the k rounds, given that it has not 15 We stress that, as opposed to the ERROR and DEVIATION messages, the simulator cannot predict whether its query is about to be answered with the ABORT message. 16 Recall that we are assuming that the simulator never makes a query that is ruled out by Steps 1 and 1' of V g;h . Since before producing output (b1; a1; : : : ; bT ; aT ) the simulator makes the query (b1; a1; : : : ; bT ; aT ), cheking the legality of the transcript in Step 3 is not really necessary (as, in case that the modi ed simulator indeed reaches the output stage \safely", we are guaranteed that it will produce a legal output). In particular, we are always guaranteed that the simulator either produces execution transcripts in which every recursive block contains at least n 1=2 =4 sessions that were accepted by V g;h , or it does not produce any output at all. 17 Note that, since we are dealing with the honest prover P, there is no need to consider the ERROR message at all (since in an interaction with the honest prover P, the adversary veri er V g;h will never output ERROR anyway). already aborted, is n ?1=2k . Thus, conditioned on the event that V g;h did not output DEVIATION beforehand, the session is completed (without being aborted) with probability (n ?1=2k ) k = n ?1=2 .
The key observation is that if h is uniformly chosen from H then, conditioned on the event that V g;h did not output DEVIATION beforehand and the current session is not aborted, the conversation between V g;h and P is distributed identically to the conversation between the honest veri er V and P on input x. By the completeness requirement for zero-knowledge protocols, we have that V accepts in such an interaction with probability at least 1=2 (this probability is actually higher, but 1=2 is more than enough for our purposes). Consequently, for uniformly selected g and h, conditioned on the event that V g;h did not output DEVIATION beforehand, the probability that a session is accepted by V g;h is at least n ? 1=2 2 . We calculate the probability that contains a block such that less than n 1=2 4 of its sessions are accepted. Say that a block B in a transcript has been completed if all the messages of sessions in B have been sent during the interaction. Say that B is admissible if the number of accepted sessions that belong to block B in the transcript is at least n 1=2 4 . Enumerating blocks in the order in which they are completed (that is, when we refer to the`t h block in , we mean the`t h block that is completed in ), we denote by `t he event that all the blocks up to and including the`t h block are admissible in .
For i 2 f1; : : : ; ng de ne a boolean indicator `i to be 1 if and only if the i th session in thè th block is accepted by V g;h . We have seen that, conditioned on the event `?1 , each `i is 1 w.p. at least n ?1=2 2 . As a consequence, for every`, the expectation of
`i (i.e., the number of accepted main sessions in block number`) is at least n 1=2 2 . Since, conditioned on `?1 , the `i 's are independent of each other, we can apply the Cherno bound, and infer that Pr `j `?1 ] > 1 ? e ? (n 1=2 ) . Furthermore, since no session belongs to more than one block, we have: Pr `] Pr l j `?1 ] Pr l?1 ]. It follows (by induction on the number of completed blocks in a transcript), that all blocks in are admissible with probability at least (1 ? e ? (n 1=2 ) ) n > 1 ? n e ? (n 1=2 ) . The lemma follows. Lemma 4.5 (performance on no-instances): For all but nitely many x 6 2 L, the above procedure rejects x with probability at least 2=3.
We can actually prove that for every positive polynomial p( ) and for all but nitely many x 6 2 L, the above procedure accepts x with probability at most 1=p(jxj). Assuming towards contradiction that this is not the case, we will construct a (probabilistic polynomial-time) strategy for a cheating prover that fools the honest veri er V with success probability at least 1=poly(n) in contradiction to the soundness (and even computational-soundness) of the proof system.
Proof of Lemma 4.(performance on no-instances)
Let us x an x 2 f0; 1g n n L as above. 18 Denote by AC = AC x the set of triplets ( ; g; h) so that on input x, internal coins and oracle access to V g;h , the simulator outputs a legal transcript (which we denote by S V g;h (x)). Recall that our contradiction assumption is that Pr ;g;h ( ; g; h) 2 AC] > 1=p(n), for some xed positive polynomial p( ). Before proceeding with the proof of Lemma 4.5, we formalize what we mean by referring to the \execution of the simulator".
De nition 5.1 (Execution of simulator) Let x; 2 f0; 1g , g 2 G and h 2 H. The execution of simulator S, denoted exec x ( ; g; h), is the sequence of queries made by S, given input x, random coins , and oracle access to V g;h (x).
Since the simulator has the ability to \rewind" the veri er V g;h and explore V g;h 's output on various execution pre xes (i.e., queries) of the same length, the number of distinct block-pre xes that appear in exec x ( ; g; h) may be strictly larger than n (recall that the schedule consists of n invocations to recursive blocks, and that in an interaction between the honest prover P and V g;h there is a one-to-one correspondence between recursive blocks and block-pre xes). As a consequence, the`t h distinct block-pre x appearing in exec x ( ; g; h) does not necessarily correspond to the`t h recursive block in the schedule. Nevertheless, given exec x ( ; g; h) and`, one can easily determine for thè th distinct block-pre x in the execution of the simulator the index of its corresponding block in the schedule (say, by extracting the`t h distinct block-pre x in exec x ( ; g; h), and then analyzing its length).
In the sequel, given a speci c block-pre x bp, we let`( bp) 2 f1; : : : ; ng denote the index of its corresponding block in the schedule (as determined by bp's length). Note that two di erent block-pre xes bp 1 and bp 2 in exec x ( ; g; h) may satisfy`( bp 1 ) =`( bp 2 ) (as they may correspond to two di erent instances of the same recursive block). In particular, session (`( bp 1 ) ; i) may have more than a single occurrence during the execution of the simulator (whereas in an interaction of the honest prover P with V g;h each session index will occur exactly once). This means that whenever we refer to an instance of session (`; i) in the simulation, we will also have to explicitly specify to which block-pre x this instance corresponds. In order to avoid cumbersome statements, we will abuse the notation`( bp) and also use it in order to specify to which instance the recursive block`( bp) corresponds. That is, whenever we refer to recursive block number`( bp) we will actually mean: \the speci c instance of recursive block number`(=`( bp) ) that corresponds to block-pre x bp in exec x ( ; g; h)". Viewed this way, for (bp 1 ) =`( bp 2 ) , sessions (`( bp 1 ) ; i) and (`( bp 2 ) ; i) actually correspond to two di erent instances of the same session in the schedule.
The cheating prover
The cheating prover (denoted P ) starts by uniformly selecting a triplet ( ; g; h) while hoping that ( ; g; h) 2 AC. It next selects uniformly a pair ( ; ) 2 f1; : : : ; t S (n)g f1; : : : ; ng, where the simulator's running time, t S (n), acts as a bound on the number of (di erent block-pre xes induced by the) queries made by S on input x 2 f0; 1g n . The prover next emulates an execution of S V g;h (r) (x) (where h (r) , which is essentially equivalent to h, will be de ned below), while interacting with V (x; r) (that is, the honest veri er, running on input x and using coins r). The prover handles the simulator's queries as well as the communication with the veri er as follows: Suppose that the simulator makes query q = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b t ; a t ), where the a's are prover messages.
1. Operating as V g;h , the cheating prover determines the block-pre x bp(q) = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b ; a ). It also determines (`; i) = sn (q), j = msg (q), the iteration-pre x ip(q) = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b ; p (n) j?1 ), and the j?1 prover messages p (i) 1 ; : : : ; p (i) j?1 appearing in the query q (as done by V g;h in
Step 2). (Note that by the modi cation of S there is no need to perform Steps 1 and 1' of V g;h .) 2. If j = 1, the cheating prover answers the simulator with the veri er's xed initiation message for session i (as done by V g;h in Step 3). (b) If b i;j = 1, and the cheating prover has only sent j?2 messages to the actual veri er, the cheating-prover forwards p (i) j?1 to the veri er, and feeds the simulator with the veri er's response (i.e., which is of the form v (i) j ). 19 (We comment that by our conventions regarding the simulator, it cannot be the case that the cheating prover has sent less than j?2 prover messages to the actual veri er. The pre xes of the current query dictate j?2 sequences of prover messages with distinct lengths, so that none of these sequences was answered with ABORT. In particular, the last message of each one of these sequences was already forwarded to the veri er.) (c) If b i;j = 1, and the cheating prover has already sent j?1 messages (or more) to the actual veri er then it retrieves the (j?1) st answer it has received and feeds it to the simulator.
(We comment that this makes sense provided that the simulator never makes two queries with the same block-pre x and the same number of prover messages, but with a di erent sequence of such messages. However, for j 2 it may be the case that a previous query regarding the same block-pre x had a di erent p On the e ciency of the cheating prover: Notice that the strategy of the cheating prover can be implemented in polynomial-time (that is, given that the simulator's running time, t S ( ), is polynomial as well). Thus, Lemma 4.5 (and so Theorem 1.1) will also hold if hP; V i is an argument system (since, in the case of argument systems, the existence of an e cient P leads to contradiction of the computational soundness of hP; V i). 19 Note that in the special case that j = 1 (i.e., when the veri er's response is the xed initiation message v (i) 1 ), the cheating prover cannot really forward p (i) j?1 to the honest veri er (since no such message exists). Still, since v (i) 1 is a xed initiation message, the cheating prover can produce v (i)
The cheating prover may "do nonsense" in Step 4c: The cheating prover is hoping to convince an honest veri er by focusing on the th session in recursive block number`( bp ) , where bp denotes the th distinct block-pre x in the simulator's execution. Prover messages in session (`( bp ) ; ) are received from the (multi-session) simulator and are forwarded to the (single-session) veri er. The honest veri er's answers are then fed back to the simulator as if they were answers given by V g;h (r) (de ned below). For the cheating prover to succeed in convincing the honest veri er the following two conditions must be satis ed: (1) Session (`( bp ) ; ) is eventually accepted by V g;h (r). ( 2) The cheating prover never "does nonsense" in Step 4c during its execution. Let us clarify the meaning of this "nonsense".
One main problem that the cheating prover is facing while conducting Step 4c emerges from the following fact: Whereas the black-box simulator is allowed to \rewind" V g;h (r) (impersonated by the cheating prover) and attempt di erent execution pre xes before proceeding with the interaction of a session, the prover cannot do so while interacting with the actual veri er. In particular, the cheating prover may reach Step 4c with a p ( ) j?1 message that is di erent from the p ( ) j?1 message that was previously forwarded to the honest veri er (in Step 4b). Given that the veri er's answer to the current p ( ) j?1 message is most likely to be di erent than the answer which was given to the \previous" p ( ) j?1 message, by answering (in Step 4c) in the same way as before, the prover action "makes no sense". 20 We stress that, at this point in its execution, the cheating prover might as well have stopped with some predetermined "failure" message (rather than "doing nonsense"). However, for simplicity of presentation, it is more convenient for us to let the cheating prover "do nonsense".
The punchline of the analysis is that with noticeable probability (over choices of ( ; g; h)), there exists a choice of ( ; ) so that the above \bad" event will not occur for session (`( bp ) ; ). That is, using the fact that the success of a \rewinding" also depends on the output of g (which determines whether and when sessions are aborted) we show that, with non-negligible probability, Step 4c is never reached with two di erent p ( ) j?1 messages. Speci cally, for every j 2 f2; : : : ; k+1g, once a p ( ) j?1 message is forwarded to the veri er (in Step 4b), all subsequent p ( ) j?1 messages are either equal to the forwarded message or are answered with ABORT (here we assume that session (`( bp ) ; ) is eventually accepted by V g;h (r), and every p ( ) j?1 message is forwarded to the veri er at least once).
De ning h (r) (mentioned above): Let ( ; g; h) and ( ; ) be the initial choices made by the cheating prover, let bp be the th block-pre x appearing in exec x ( ; g; h), and suppose that the honest veri er uses coins r. Then, the function h (r) = h (r; ;g;h; ; ) is de ned to be uniformly distributed among the functions h 0 which satisfy the following conditions: The value of h 0 when applied on ( ; bp ) equals r, whereas for ( 0 ; 0 ) 6 = ( ; ) the value of h 0 when applied on ( 0 ; bp 0) equals the value of h on this pre x. (The set of such functions h 0 is not empty due to the hypothesis that the functions are selected in a family of t S (n)-wise independent hash functions.) We note that replacing h by h (r) does not e ect Step 5 of the cheating prover, and that the cheating prover does not know h (r) . In particular, whenever the honest veri er V uses coins r, one may think of the cheating prover as if it is answering the simulator's queries with the answers that would have been given by V g;h (r). At rst glance, it seems obvious that the function h (r) , which is uniformly distributed amongst all functions that are de ned to be equal to h on all inputs (except for the input ( ; bp ) on which it equals r) is uniformly distributed in H. Taking a closer look, however, one realizes that a rigorous proof for the above claim is more complex than one may initially think, since it is not even clear that an h that is de ned by the above process actually belongs to the family H.
The main di culty in proving the above lies in the fact that the simulator's queries may \adap-tively\ depend on previous answers it has received (which, in turn, may depend on previous outcomes of h). The key obervation used in order to overcome this di culty is that for every family of t S (n)-wise independent functions and for every sequence of at most t S (n) arguments (and in particular, for an adaptively chosen sequence), the values of a uniformly chosen function when applied to the arguments in the sequence are uniformly and independently distributed. Thus, as long as the values assigned to the function in the rst stage of the above process are uniformly and independently distributed (which is indeed the case, even if we constraint one output to be equal to r), the process will yield a uniformly distributed function from H.
The success probability of the cheating prover
We start by introducing two important notions that will play a central role in the analysis of the success probability of the cheating prover.
Grouping queries according to their iteration-pre xes
In the sequel, it will be convenient to group the queries of the simulator into di erent classes based on di erent iteration-pre xes. (Recall that the iteration-pre x of a query q (satisfying sn (q)=(`; i) and msg (q)=j >1) is the pre x of q that ends with the (j?1) st prover message in session (`; n).). Grouping by iteration-pre xes particularly makes sense in the case that two queries are of the same length (see discussion below). Nevertheless, by De nition 4.3, two queries may have the same iteration-pre x even if they are of di erent lengths (see below).
De nition 5.3 (ip-di erent queries) Two queries, q 1 and q 2 (of possibly di erent lengths), are said to be ip-di erent, if and only if they have di erent iteration-pre xes (that is, ip(q 1 )6 =ip(q 2 )). By De nition 4.3, if two queries, q 1 and q 2 , satisfy ip(q 1 ) = ip(q 2 ), then the following two conditions must hold: (1) sn (q 1 ) = (`; i 1 ), sn (q 2 ) = (`; i 2 ) and; (2) msg (q 1 ) = msg (q 2 ). However, it is not necessarily true that i 1 = i 2 . In particular, it may very well be the case that q 1 ; q 2 have di erent lengths (i.e., i 1 6 = i 2 ) but are not ip-di erent (note that if i 1 = i 2 then q 1 and q 2 are of equal length). Still, even if two queries are of the same length and have the same iteration-pre x, it is not necessarily true that they are equal, as they may be di erent at some message which occurs after their iteration-pre xes.
Motivating De nition 5.3: Recall that a necessary condition for the success of the cheating prover is that for every j, once a p ( ) j?1 message has been forwarded to the veri er (in Step 4b), all subsequent p ( ) j?1 messages (that are not answered with ABORT) are equal to the forwarded message. In order to satisfy the above condition it is su cient to require that the cheating prover never reaches Steps 4b and 4c with two ip-di erent queries of equal length. The reason for this is that if two queries of the same length have the same iteration-pre x, then they contain the same sequence of prover messages for the corresponding session (since all such messages are contained in the iteration-pre x), and so they agree on their p ( ) j?1 message. In particular, once a p ( ) j?1 message has been forwarded to the veri er (in Step 4b), all subsequent queries that reach Step 4c and are of the same lenght will have the same p ( ) j?1 messages as the rst such query (since they have the same iteration-pre x).
In light of the above discussion, it is only natural to require that the number of ip-di erent queries that reach Step 4c of the cheating prover is exactly one (as, in such a case, the above necessary condition is indeed sati ed). 21 Jumping ahead, we comment that the smaller is the number of ip-di erent queries that correspond to block-pre x bp , the smaller is the probability that more than one ip-di erent query reaches Step 4c. The reason for this lies in the fact that the number of ip-di erent queries that correspond to block-pre x bp is equal to the number of di erent iteration-pre xes that correspond to bp . In particular, the smaller is the number of such iteration-pre xes, the smaller is the probability that g will evaluate to 1 on more than a single iteration-pre x (thus reaching Step 4c with more than one ip-di erent query).
Useful block-pre xes
The probability that the cheating prover makes the honest veri er accept will be lower bounded by the probability that the th distinct block-pre x in exec x ( ; g; h) is -useful (in the sense hinted above and de ned next):
De nition 5.4 (Useful block-pre x) A speci c block-pre x bp = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b ; a ), appearing in exec x ( ; g; h), is called i-useful if it satis es the following two conditions:
1. For every j 2f2; ::; k+1g, the number of ip-di erent queries q in exec x ( ; g; h) that correspond to block-pre x bp and satisfy sn (q)=(`( bp) ; i), msg (q)=j, and g(i; ip(q))=1, is exactly one. 2. The (only) query q in exec x ( ; g; h) that corresponds to block-pre x bp and that satis es sn (q) = (`( bp) ; i), msg (q) = k+1, and g(i; ip(q)) = 1, is answered with ACCEPT by V g;h .
If there exists an i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, so that a block-pre x is i-useful, then this block-pre x is called useful.
Condition 1 in De nition 5.4 states that for every xed value of j there exists exactly one iterationpre x, ip, that corresponds to queries of the block-pre x bp and the the j th message so that g(i; ip) evaluates to 1. Condition 2 asserts that the last veri er message in the i th main session of recursive block number`=`( bp) is equal to ACCEPT. It follows that if the cheating prover happens to select ( ; g; h; ; ) so that block-pre x bp (i.e., the th distinct block-pre x in exec x ( ; g; h (r) )) isuseful, then it convinces V (x; r); the reason being that (by Condition 2) the last message in session (`( bp ) ; ) is answered with ACCEPT, 22 and that (by Condition 1) the emulation does not get into trouble in Step 4c of the cheating prover (to see this, notice that each prover message in session (`( bp ) ; ) will end up reaching Step 4c only once).
Let hP ; V i(x) = hP ( ; g; h; ; ); V (r)i(x) denote the random variable representing the (local) output of the honest veri er V when interacting with the cheating prover P on common input x, where ; g; h; ; are the initial random choices made by the cheating prover P , and r is the randomness used by the honest veri er V . Adopting this notation, we will say that the cheating prover P = P (x; ; g; h; ; ) has convinced the honest veri er V = V (x; r) if hP ; V i(x) = ACCEPT.
With these notations, we are ready to formalize the above discussion.
Claim 5.5 If the cheating prover happens to select ( ; g; h; ; ) so that the th distinct blockpre x in exec x ( ; g; h (r) ) is -useful, then the cheating prover convinces V (x; r) (i.e., hP ; V i(x)= ACCEPT).
Proof: Let us x x 2 f0; 1g n , 2 f0; 1g , g 2 G, h 2 H, r 2 f1; : : : ; V (n)g, 2 f1; : : : ; ng, and 2 f1; : : : ; t S (n)g. We show that if the th distinct block-pre x in exec x ( ; g; h (r) ) is -useful, then the cheating prover P (x; ; g; h; ; ) convinces the honest veri er V (x; r). By de nition of the cheating-prover, the prover messages that are actually forwarded to the honest veri er (in Step 4b) correspond to session (`( bp ) ; ). Speci cally, messages that are forwarded by the cheating prover are of the form p ( ) j?1 , and correspond to queries q, that satisfy sn (q) = (`( bp ) ; ), msg (q) = j and g( ; ip(q)) = 1. Since the th distinct block-pre x in exec x ( ; g; h (r) ) is -useful, we have that for every j 2 f2; : : : ; k+1g, there is exactly one query q that satis es the above conditions. Thus, for every j 2 f2; : : : ; k+1g, the cheating prover never reaches Step 4c with two di erent p ( ) j?1 messages. Here we use the fact that if two queries of the same length are not ip-di erent (i.e., have the same iteration-pre x) then the answers given by V g;h (r) to these queries are identical (see discussion above). This in particular means that P is answering the simulator's queries with the answers that would have been given by V g;h (r) itself. (Put in other words, whenever the th distinct block-pre x in exec x ( ; g; h (r) ) is -useful, the emulation does not "get into trouble" in Step 4c of the cheating prover.)
At this point, we have that the cheating prover never fails to perform Step 4c, and so the interaction that it is conducting with V (x; r) reaches \safely" the (k+1) st veri er message in the protocol. To complete the proof we have to show that at the end of the interaction with the cheatingprover, V (x; r) outputs ACCEPT. This is true since, by Condition 2 of De nition 5.4, the query q, that corresponds to block-pre x bp , satis es sn (q) = (`( bp ) ; ), msg (q) = j and g( ; ip(q)) = 1, is answered with ACCEPT. Here we use the fact that V (x; r) behaves exactly as V g;h (r) behaves on queries that correspond to the th distinct block-pre x in exec x ( ; g; h (r) ).
Reduction to rareness of legal transcripts without useful block-pre xes
The following lemma (Lemma 5.6) establishes the connection between the success probability of the simulator and the success probability of the cheating-prover. Loosely speaking, the lemma asserts that if S outputs a legal transcript with non-negligible probability, then the cheating prover will succeed in convincing the honest veri er with non-negligible probability. Since this is in contradiction to the computational soundness of the proof system, we have that Lemma 5.6 actually implies the correctness of Lemma 4.5 (recall that the contradiction hypothesis of Lemma 4.5 is that the probability that the simulator outputs a legal transcript is non-negligible).
Lemma 5.6 Suppose that Pr ;g;h ( ; g; h) 2 AC] > 1=p(n) for some xed polynomial p( ). Then the probability (taken over ; g; h; ; ; r), that hP ; V i(x) = ACCEPT is at least where the second probability refers to an interaction between S and V g;h (r). Since for every value of ; g; and , when h and r are uniformly selected the function h (r) is uniformly distributed (see Claim 5.2), we infer that:
Pr ;g;h; ; ;r h useful ; ( ; g; h (r) ) i = Pr ;g;h 0 ; ; useful ; ( ; g; h 0 )
On the other hand, since and are distributed independently of ( ; g; h), we have:
Pr ;g;h; ; useful ; ( ; g; h)] = Pr ;g;h; ; ;r hP ; V i(x) = ACCEPT] Pr ;g;h 9d; i s.t. useful d;i ( ; g; h)] 1 t S (n) n (5) Recall that by our hypothesis, Pr ( ; g; h) 2 AC] > 1=p(n) for some xed polynomial p( Lemma 5.7 The probability (taken over ; g; h), that for all pairs (d; i) useful d;i ( ; g; h) does not hold and that ( ; g; h) 2 AC, is negligible. That is, the probability that exec x ( ; g; h) does not contain a useful block-pre x and S outputs a legal transcript is negligible. This completes the proof of Lemma 5.6. The rest of this section is devoted to proving Lemma 5.7.
Proof of Lemma 5.7 (existence of useful block-pre xes in legal transcripts)
The proof of Lemma 5.7 will proceed as follows. We rst de ne a special kind of block-pre xes, called potentially-useful block-pre xes. Loosely speaking, these are block-pre xes in which the simulator does not make too many \rewinding" attempts (each \rewinding" corresponds to a di erent iteration-pre x). Intuitively, the larger the number of \rewindings" is, the smaller is the probability that a speci c block-pre x is useful. A block-pre x with a small number of \rewindings" is thus more likely to cause its block-pre x to be useful. Thus our basic approach will be to show that:
1. In every \successful" execution (i.e., producing a legal transcript), the simulator generates a potentially-useful block-pre x. This is proved by demonstrating, based on the structure of the schedule, that if no potentially-useful block-pre x exists, then the simulation must take super-polynomial time. 2. Any potentially-useful block-pre x is in fact useful with considerable probability. The argument that demonstrates this claim proceeds basically as follows. Consider a speci c blockpre x bp, let`=`( bp) , and focus on a speci c instance of session (`; i) (that is, the speci c instance of session (`; i) that corresponds to block-pre x bp). Suppose that block-pre x bp is potentially-useful and that the above instance of session (`; i) happens to be accepted by V g;h . This means that there exist k queries with block-pre x bp that consist of the \main thread" that leads to acceptance (i.e., all queries that were not answered with ABORT). Recall that the decision to abort a session (`; i) is made by applying the function g to i and the iteration-pre x of the corresponding query. Thus, if there are only few di erent iterationpre xes that correspond to block-pre x bp (which, as we said, is potentially-useful), then there is considerable probability that all the queries having block-pre x bp, but which do not belong to that \main thread", will be answered with ABORT (that is, g will evaluate to 0 on the corresponding input). If this lucky event occurs, then block-pre x bp will indeed be useful (recall that for a block-pre x to be useful we require that there exists a corresponding session that is accepted by V g;h and satis es that for every j 2 f2; : : : ; k+1g there is a single iteration-pre x that makes g evaluate to 1 at the j th message of this session). Returning to the actual proof, we start by introducing the necessary de nition (of a potentiallyuseful block-pre x). Recall that, for any g 2 G and h 2 H, the running time of the simulator S with oracle access to V g;h is bounded by t S (n). Let c be a constant such that t S (n) n c for all su ciently large n.
De nition 5.8 (Potentially-useful block-pre x) A speci c block-pre x bp = (b 1 ; a 1 ; ::; b ; a ), appearing in exec x ( ; g; h), is called potentially-useful if it satis es the following two conditions:
1. The number of ip-di erent queries that correspond to block-pre x bp is at most k c+1 . 2. The execution of the simulator reaches the end of the block that corresponds to block-pre x bp. That is, exec x ( ; g; h) contains a query q, that ends with the (k+1) st prover message in the n th main session of recursive block number`( bp) (i.e., some p (`( bp) ;n) k+1 message).
We stress that the bound k c+1 in Condition 1 above refers to the same constant c > 0 that is used in the time bound t S (n) n c . Using De nition 5.3 (of ip-di erent queries), we have that a bound of k c+1 on the number of ip-di erent queries that correspond to block-pre x bp induces an upper bound on the total number of iteration-pre xes that correspond to block-pre x bp. Note that this is in contrast to the de nition of a useful block-pre x (De nition 5.4), in which we only have a bound on the number of ip-di erent queries of a speci c length (i.e., the number of ip-di erent queries that correspond to speci c message in a speci c session). Turning to Condition 2 of De nition 5.8 we recall that the query q ends with a p (`( bp) ;n) k+1 message (i.e., the last prover message of recursive block number`( bp) ). Technically speaking, this means that q does not actually correspond to block-pre x bp (since, by de nition of the recursive schedule, the answer to query q is a message that does not belong to recursive block number`( bp) ). Nevertheless, since before making query q, the simulator has made queries to all pre xes of q, we are guaranteed that for every i 2 f1; : : : ; ng and j 2 f1; : : : ; k +1g, the simulator has made a query q i;j that is a pre x of q, corresponds to block-pre x bp, and satis es sn (q) = (`( bp) ; i) and msg (q) = j. (In other words, all messages of all sessions in recursive block number`( bp) have occurred during the execution of the simulator.) Furthermore, since the (modi ed) simulator does not make a query that is answered with a DEVIATION message (in Step 1' of V g;h ) and it does make the query q , we are guaranteed that the partial execution transcript induced by the query q contains the accepting conversations of at least n 1=2 4 sessions in recursive block number`( bp) . (The latter observation will be used only at a later stage (while proving Lemma 5.7).)
It is worth noting that whereas the de nition of a useful block-pre x refers to the contents of iteration-pre xes (induced by the queries) that are sent by the simulator, the de nition of a potentially-useful block-pre x refers only to their quantity (neither to their contents nor to the e ect of the application of g on them). 23 It is thus natural that statements referring to potentiallyuseful block-pre xes tend to have a combinatorial avor. The following lemma is no exception. It asserts that every \successful" execution of the simulator must contain a potentially-useful blockpre x (or, otherwise, the simulator will run in super-polynomial time).
Lemma 5.9 For any ( ; g; h) 2 AC x , exec x ( ; g; h) contains a potentially-useful block-pre x. 5.3.1 Proof of Lemma 5.9 (existence of potentially-useful block-pre xes) The proof of Lemma 5.9 is by contradiction. We assume the existence of a triplet ( ; g; h) 2 AC so that every block-pre x in exec x ( ; g; h) is not potentially-useful, and show that this implies that S V h (x) made strictly more than n c queries (which contradicts the explicit hypothesis that the running time of S is bounded by n c ).
The query{and{answer tree: Throughout the proof of Lemma 5.9, we will x an arbitrary ( ; g; h) 2 AC as above, and study the corresponding exec x ( ; g; h). A key vehicle in this study is the notion of a query{and{answer tree introduced in 26] (and also used in 29]). 24 This is a rooted tree (corresponding to exec x ( ; g; h)) in which vertices are labeled with veri er messages and edges are labeled with prover's messages. The root is labeled with the xed veri er message initializing the rst session, and has outgoing edges corresponding to the prover's messages initializing this session. In general, paths down the tree (i.e., from the root to some vertices) correspond to queries. The query associated with such a path is obtained by concatenating the labeling of the vertices and edges along the path in the order traversed. We stress that each vertex in the query{and{answer tree corresponds to a query actually made by the simulator.
The index of the veri er (resp., prover) message labeling a speci c vertex (resp., edge) in the tree is completely determined by the level in which the vertex (resp., edge) lies. That is, all vertices (resp., edges) in the ! th level of the tree are labeled with the ! th veri er (resp., prover) message in the schedule (out of a total of n 2 (k+1) scheduled messages). For example, if ! = n 2 (k+1) all vertices (resp., edges) at the ! th level (which is the lowest possible level in the tree) are labeled with v (n;n) k+1 (resp., p (n;n) k+1 ). The di erence between \sibling" vertices in the same level of the tree lies in the di erence in the labels of their incoming edges (as induced by the simulator's \rewindings"). Speci cally, whenever the simulator \rewinds" the interaction to the ! th veri er message in the schedule (i.e., makes a new query that is answered with the ! th veri er message), the corresponding vertex in the tree (which lies at the ! th level) will have multiple descendants one level down in the tree (i.e., at the (!+1) st level). The edges to each one of these descendants will be labeled with a di erent prover message. 25 We stress that the di erence between these prover messages lies in the contents of the corresponding message (and not in its index).
By the above discussion, the outdegree of every vertex in the query{and{answer tree corresponds to the number of \rewindings" that the simulator has made to the relevant point in the schedule (the order in which the outgoing edges appear in the tree does not necessarily correspond to the order in which the \rewindings" were actually performed by the simulator). Vertices in which the simulator does not perform a \rewinding" will thus have a single outgoing edge. In particular, in case that the simulator follows the prescribed prover strategy P (sending each scheduled message exactly once), all vertices in the tree will have outdegree one, and the tree will actually consist of a single path of total length n 2 (k+1) (ending with an edge that is labeled with a p (n;n) k+1 message). Recall that, by our conventions regarding the simulator, before making a query q the simulator has made queries to all pre xes of q. Since every query corresponds to a path down the tree, we have that every particular path down the query{and{answer tree is developed from the root downwards (that is, within a speci c path, a level ! < ! 0 vertex is always visited before a level ! 0 vertex). However, we cannot say anything about the order in which di erent paths in the tree are developed (for example, we cannot assume that the simulator has made all queries that end at a level ! vertex before making any other query that ends at a level ! 0 > ! vertex, or that it has visited all vertices of level ! in some speci c order). To summarize, the only guarantee that we have about the order in which the query{and{answer tree is developed is implied by the convention that before making a speci c query, the simulator has made queries to all relevant pre xes.
Satis ed path: A path from one node in the tree to some of its descendants is said to satisfy session i if the path contains edges (resp., vertices) for each of the messages sent by the prover (resp., veri er) in session i. A path is called satis ed if it satis es all sessions for which the veri er's rst message appears along the path. One important example for a satis ed path is the path that starts at the root of the query{and{answer tree and ends with an edge that is labeled with a p (n;n) k+1 message. This path contains all n 2 (k+1) messages in the schedule (and so satis es all n 2 sessions in the schedule). We stress that the contents of messages (occurring as labels) along a path are completely irrelevant to the question of whether the path is satis ed or not. In particular, a path may be satis ed even if some (or even all) of the vertices along it are labeled with ABORT. Recall that, by our conventions, the simulator never makes a query that is answered with the DEVIATION message. We are thus guaranteed that, for every completed block along a path in the tree, at least n 1=2 4 sessions are accepted by V g;h . In particular, the vertices corresponding to messages of these accepted sessions cannot be labeled with ABORT.
Good sub-tree: Consider an arbitrary sub-tree (of the query{and{answer tree) that satis es the following two conditions:
1. The sub-tree is rooted at a vertex corresponding to the rst message of some session so that this session is the rst main session of some recursive invocation of the schedule. 2. Each path in the sub-tree is truncated at the last message of the relevant recursive invocation. The full tree (i.e., the tree rooted at the vertex labeled with the rst message in the schedule) is indeed such a tree, but we will need to consider sub-trees which correspond to m sessions in the recursive schedule construction (i.e., correspond to R m ). We call such a sub-tree m-good if it contains a satis ed path starting at the root of the sub-tree. Since ( ; g; h)2AC, we have that the simulator has indeed produced a \legal" transcript as output. It follows that the full tree contains a path from the root to a leaf that contains vertices (resp., edges) for each of the messages sent by the veri er (resp., prover) in all n 2 sessions of the schedule (as otherwise the transcript S V g;h (x) would have not been legal). In other words, the full tree contains a satis ed path and is thus n 2 -good.
Note that, by the de nition of the recursive schedule, two m-good sub-trees are always disjoint. On the other hand, if m 0 < m, it may be the case that an m 0 -good sub-tree is contained in another m-good sub-tree. As a matter of fact, since an m-good sub-tree contains all messages of all sessions in a recursive block corresponding to R m , then it must contain at least k disjoint m?n k -good subtrees (i.e., that correspond to k the recursive invocations of Rm?n k made by R m ).
The next lemma (which can be viewed as the crux of the proof) states that, if the contradiction hypothesis of Lemma 5.9 is satis ed, then the number of disjoint m?n k -good sub-trees that are contained in an m-good sub-tree is actually considerably larger than k. 
Since for all but nitely many n, Eq. (6) solves to W(n 2 ) > n c (see Section B in the Appendix), and since every vertex in the query{and{answer tree corresponds to a query actually made by the simulator, it follows that the hypothesis that the simulator runs in time that is bounded by n c (and hence the full n 2 -good tree must have been of size at most n c ) is contradicted. Thus, Lemma 5.9 will actually follow from Lemma 5.10.
Proof (of Lemma 5.10): Let T be an arbitrary m-good sub-tree of the query{and{answer tree.
Considering the m sessions corresponding to an m-good sub-tree, we focus on the n main sessions of this level of the recursive construction. Let B T denote the recursive block to which the indices of these n sessions belong. A T-query is a query q whose corresponding path down the query{and{ answer tree ends with a node that belongs to T (recall that every query q appearing in exec x ( ; g; h)
corresponds to a path down the full tree), and that satis es sn (q) 2 B T . 26 We rst claim that all T-queries q in exec x ( ; g; h) have the same block-pre x. This block-pre x corresponds to the path from the root of the full tree to the root of T, and is denoted by bp T .
Fact 5.11 All T-queries in exec x ( ; g; h) have the same block-pre x (denoted bp T ). Proof: Assume, towards contradiction, that there exist two di erent T-queries q 1 ; q 2 so that bp(q 1 ) 6 = bp(q 2 ). In particular, bp(q 1 ) and bp(q 2 ) must di er in a message that precedes the rst message of the rst main session in B T . (Note that if two block-pre xes are equal in all messages preceding the rst message of the rst session of the relevant block then, by de nition, they are equal. 27 ) This means that the paths that correspond to q 1 and q 2 split from each other before they reach the root of T (remember that T is rooted at a node corresponding to the rst main session of recursive block B T ). But this contradicts the fact that both paths that correspond to these queries end with a node in T, and the fact follows. 2 Using the hypothesis that no block-pre x in exec x ( ; g; h) is potentially-useful, we prove:
Claim 5.12 Let T be an m-good sub-tree. Then the number of ip-di erent queries that correspond to block-pre x bp T is at least k c+1 .
Proof: Since all block-pre xes that appear in exec x ( ; g; h) are not potentially-useful (by the hypothesis of Lemma 5.10), this holds as a special case for block-pre x bp T . Let`=`( bp T ) be the index of the recursive block that corresponds to block-pre x bp T in exec x ( ; g; h). Since blockpre x bp T is not potentially-useful, at least one of the two conditions of De nition 5.8 is violated. In other words, one of the following two conditions is satis ed: 1. The number of ip-di erent queries that correspond to block-pre x bp T is at least k c+1 .
2. The execution of the simulator does not reach the end of the block that corresponds to block-pre x bp T (i.e., there is no query in exec x ( ; g; h) that ends with a p (`;n) k+1 message that corresponds to block-pre x bp T ). Now, since T is an m-good sub-tree, then it must contain a satis ed path. Such a path starts at the root of T and satis es all sessions whose rst veri er message appears along the path. The key observation is that every satis ed path that starts at the root of sub-tree T must satisfy all the 26 Note that queries q that satisfy sn(q) 2 BT do not necessarily correspond to a path that ends with a node in T (as execx( ; g; h) may contain a di erent sub-tree T 0 that satis es BT = B T 0). Also note that there exist queries q, whose corresponding path ends with a node that belongs to T, but satisfy sn(q) 6 2 BT . This is so, since T may also contain vertices that correspond to messages in sessions which are not main sessions of BT (in particular, all sessions that belong to the lower level recursive blocks that are invoked by block BT ). 27 Recall that the index of the relevant block is determined by the length of the corresponding block-pre x main sessions in B T (to see this, notice that the rst message of all main sessions in B T will always appear along such a path), and so it contains all messages of all main session in recursive block B T . In particular, the sub-tree T contains a path that starts at the root of T and ends with an edge that is labeled with the last prover message in session number (`; n) (i.e., a p (`;n) k+1 message). In other words, the execution of the simulator does reach the end of the block that corresponds to block-pre x bp T (since, for the above path to exist, the simulator must have made a query that ends with a p (`;n) k+1 message that corresponds to block-pre x bp T ), and so Condition 2 above does not apply. Thus, the only reason that may cause block-pre x bp T not to be potentially-useful is Condition 1. We conclude that the number of ip-di erent queries that correspond to block-pre x bp T is at least k c+1 , as required. 2
The following claim establishes the connection between the number of ip-di erent queries that correspond to block-pre x bp T and the number of m?n k -good sub-trees contained in T. Loosely speaking, this is achieved based on the following three observations: (1) Two queries are said to be ip-di erent if and only if they have di erent iteration-pre xes. (2) Every iteration-pre x is a block-pre x of some sub-schedule one level down in the recursive construction (consisting of m?n k sessions). (3) Every such distinct block-pre x yields a distinct m?n k -good sub-tree.
Claim 5.13 Let T be an m-good sub-tree. Then for every pair of ip-di erent queries that correspond to block-pre x bp T , the sub-tree T contains two disjoint m?n k -good sub-trees.
Once Claim 5.13 is proved, we can use it in conjunction with Claim 5.12 to infer that T contains at least k c+1 disjoint m?n k -good sub-trees.
Proof: Before we proceed with the proof of Claim 5.13, we introduce the notion of an iteration-su x of a query q. This is the su x of q that starts at the ending point of the query's iteration-pre x. A key feature satis ed by an iteration-su x of a query is that it contains all the messages of all sessions belonging to some invocation of the schedule one level down in the recursive construction (this follows directly from the structure of our xed schedule).
De nition 5.14 (Iteration-su x) The iteration-su x of a query q (satisfying j = msg (q) > 1), denoted is(q), is the su x of q that begins at the ending point of the iteration-pre x of query q. That is, for q = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; a t ; b t ) if ip(q) = (b 1 ; a 1 ; : : : ; b ?1 ; a ) then is(q) = (a ; b +1 ; : : : ; a t ; b t ). 28 Let q be a query, and let (`; i) = sn (q), j = msg (q). Let P(q) denote the path corresponding to query q in the query-and-answer tree. Let P ip (q) denote the sub-path of P(q) that corresponds to the iteration-pre x ip(q) of q, and let P is (q) denote the sub-path of P(q) that corresponds to the iteration-su x is(q) of q. That is, the sub-path P ip (q) starts at the root of the full tree, and ends at a p (`;n) j?1 message, whereas the sub-path P is (q) starts at a p (`;n) j?1 message and ends at a v (`;i) j message (in particular, path P(q) can be obtained by concatenating P ip (q) with P is (q) 29 ). Fact 5.15 For every query q 2 exec x ( ; g; h), the sub-path P is (q) is satis ed. Moreover: 1. The sub-path P is (q) satis es all m?n k sessions of a recursive invocation one level down in the recursive construction (i.e., corresponding to Rm?n k ).
Proof: Let (`; i)= sn (q) and j = msg (q). By nature of our xed scheduling, the vertex in which sub-path P is (q) begins precedes the rst message of all (nested) sessions in the (j ?1) st recursive invocation made by recursive block number`(i.e., an instance of Rm?n k which is invoked by R m ).
Since query q is answered with a v (`;i) j message, we have that the sub-path P is (q) eventually reaches a vertex labeled with v (`;i) j . In particular, the sub-path P is (q) (starting at a p (`;n) j?1 edge and ending at a v (`;i) j vertex) contains the rst and last messages of each of the above (nested) sessions, and so contains edges (resp., vertices) for each prover (resp., veri er) message in these sessions. But this means (by de nition) that all these (nested) sessions are satis ed by P is (q). Since the above (nested) sessions are the only sessions whose rst message appears along the sub-path P is (q), we have that P is (q) is satis ed. To see that whenever q corresponds to block-pre x bp T the sub-path P is (q) is contained in the sub-tree T, we observe that both its starting point (i.e., a p (`;n) j?1 edge) and its ending point (i.e., a v (`;i) j vertex) are contained in T. 2 Fact 5.16 Let q 1 ; q 2 be two ip-di erent queries. Then P is (q 1 ) and P is (q 2 ) are disjoint. Proof: Let q 1 and q 2 be two ip-di erent queries, let (`1; i 1 ) = sn (q 1 ); (`2; i 2 ) = sn (q 2 ), and let j 1 = msg (q 1 ); j 2 = msg (q 2 ). Recall that queries q 1 and q 2 are said to be ip-di erent if and only if they have di erent iteration-pre xes. Since q 1 and q 2 are assumed to be ip-di erent, then so are iteration-pre xes ip(q 1 ) and ip(q 2 ). In particular, the paths P ip (q 1 ) and P ip (q 2 ) are di erent. We distinguish between the following two cases:
1. Path P ip (q 1 ) splits from P ip (q 2 ): In such a case, the ending points of paths P ip (q 1 ) and P ip (q 2 ) must belong to di erent sub-trees of the query{and{answer tree. Since the starting point of an iteration-su x is the ending point of the corresponding iteration-pre x, we must have that paths P is (q 1 ) and P is (q 2 ) are disjoint. 2. Path P ip (q 1 ) is a pre x of path P ip (q 2 ): That is, both P ip (q 1 ) and P ip (q 2 ) reach a v (`1;n) j 1 ?1 vertex, while path P ip (q 2 ) continues down the tree and reaches a v (`2;n) j 2 ?1 vertex. The key observation in this case is that either`1 is strictly smaller than`2, or j 1 is strictly smaller than j 2 . The reason for this is that in case both`1 =`2 and j 1 = j 2 hold, iteration-pre x ip(q 1 ) must be equal to iteration-pre x ip(q 2 ), 30 in contradiction to our hypothesis. Since path P is (q 1 ) starts at a p (`1;n) j 1 ?1 vertex and ends with a v (`1;i 1 ) j 1 vertex, and since path P is (q 2 ) starts with a p (`2;n) j 2 ?1 vertex, we have that the ending point of path P is (q 1 ) precedes the starting point of path P is (q 2 ) (this is so since if j 1 < j 2 , the p (`1;i 1 ) j 1 message will always precede/equal the p (`2;n) j 2 ?1 message). In particular, paths P is (q 1 ) and P is (q 2 ) are disjoint. It follows that for every two ip-di erent queries, q 1 and q 2 , sub-paths P is (q 1 ) and P is (q 2 ) are disjoint, as required. 2
Back to the proof of Claim 5.13, let q 1 and q 2 be two ip-di erent queries that correspond to blockpre x bp T (as guaranteed by the hypothesis of Claim 5.13), and let P is (q 1 ) and P is (q 2 ) be as above.
Consider the two sub-trees, T 1 and T 2 , of T that are rooted at the starting point of sub-paths P is (q 1 ) and P is (q 2 ) respectively (note that by, Fact 5.15, T 1 and T 2 are indeed sub-trees of T). By de nition of our recursive schedule, T 1 and T 2 correspond to m?n k sessions one level down in the recursive construction (i.e., to an instance of Rm?n k ). Using Fact 5.15 we infer that sub-path P is (q 1 ) (resp., P is (q 2 )) contains all messages of all sessions in T 1 (resp., T 2 ), and so the sub-tree T 1 (resp., T 2 ), is m?n k -good. In addition, since sub-paths P is (q 1 ) and P is (q 2 ) are disjoint (by Fact 5.16) and since, by de nition of an m?n k -good tree, two di erent m?n k -good trees are always disjoint, then T 1 and T 2 (which, being rooted at di erent vertices, must be di erent) are also disjoint. It follows that for every pair of di erent queries that correspond to block-pre x bp T , the sub-tree T contains two disjoint m?n k -good sub-trees. We are nally ready to establish Lemma 5.10 (using Claims 5.12 and 5.13). By Claim 5.12, we have that the number of di erent queries that correspond to block-pre x bp T is at least k c+1 . Since (by Claim 5.13), for every pair of di erent queries that correspond to block-pre x bp T the sub-tree T contains two disjoint m?n k -good sub-trees, we infer that T contains a total of at least k c+1 disjoint m?n k -good sub-trees (corresponding to the (at least) k c+1 di erent queries mentioned above). Lemma 5.10 follows.
Back to the Proof of Lemma 5.7 (existence of useful block-pre xes)
Once the correctness of Lemma 5.9 is established, we may proceed with the proof of Lemma 5.7. Let x 2 f0; 1g n . We bound from above the probability, taken over the choices of 2 f0; 1g ; g Consider a speci c d 2 f1; : : : ; t S (n)g so that pot?use d ( ; g; h) is satis ed (i.e., the d th block pre x in exec x ( ; g; h) is potentially-useful). By Condition 2 in the de nition of a potentially-useful blockpre x (De nition 5.8), the execution of the simulator reaches the end of the corresponding block in the schedule. In other words, there exists a query q 2 exec x ( ; g; h) that ends with the (k + 1) st prover message in the n th main session of recursive block number`( bp d ) , where bp d denotes the d th distinct block-pre x in exec x ( ; g; h), and`( bp d ) denotes the index of the recursive block that corresponds to block-pre x bp d in exec x ( ; g; h). Since, by our convention and the modi cation of the simulator, S never generates a query that is answered with a DEVIATION message, we have that the partial execution transcript induced by query q must contain the accepting conversations of at least n 1=2 4 main sessions in block number`( bp d ) (as otherwise query q would have been answered with the DEVIATION message in Step 1' of V g;h ). Proof: Let x 2 f0; 1g . Fix some 2 f0; 1g , h 2 H, d 2 f1; : : : ; t S (n)g and a set S f1; : : : ; ng.
Denote by bp d = bp d (g) the d th distinct block-pre x in exec x ( ; h; g), and by`( bp d ) the index of its corresponding recursive block in the schedule. We bound the probability, taken over the choice of g r G, that for all i 2 S block-pre x bp d is not i-useful, even though it is potentially-useful and for all i 2 S the query q (bp d ) contains an accepting conversation for session (`( bp d ) ; i). 31 Since the simulator is allowed to feed V g;h with di erent queries of the same length, we have that the execution of the simulator may reach the end of the corresponding block more than once (and thus, execx( ; g; h) may contain more than a single query that ends with the (k+1) st prover message in the n th main session of block number`( bp d ) ). Since each time that the simulator reaches the end of the corresponding block, the above set of accepted sessions may be di erent, we are not able to pinpoint a speci c set of accepted sessions without explicitly specifying to which one of the above queries we are referring. We solve this problem by explicitly referring to the rst query that satis es the above conditions (note that, in our case, such a query is always guaranteed to exist). 32 Note that the second condition implies the rst one. Namely, if the last veri er message of session (`( bp d ) ; i) equals ACCEPT, then no prover message in this session could have been answered with ABORT. A technical problem resolved: In order to prove Lemma 5.17 we need to focus on the d th distinct block-pre x in exec x ( ; h; g) (denoted by bp d ) and analyze the behaviour of a uniformly chosen g when applied to the various iteration-pre xes that correspond to bp d . However, trying to do so we encounter a technical problem. This problem is caused by the fact that the contents of block-pre x bp d depends on g. 33 In particular, it does not make sense to analyze the behaviour of a uniformly chosen g on iteration-pre xes that correspond to an \undetermined" block-pre x (since it is not possible to determine the iteration-pre xes that correspond to bp d when bp d itself is not determined). To overcome the above problem, we rely on the following observations:
1. Whenever ; h and d are xed, the contents of block-pre x bp d is completely determined by the output of g on inputs that have occurred before bp d has been reached (i.e., has appeared as a block-pre x of some query) for the rst time. 2. All iteration-pre xes that correspond to block-pre x bp d occur after bp d has been reached for the rst time. It is thus possible to carry out the analysis by considering the output of g only on inputs that have occurred after bp d has been determined. That is, xing ; h and d we distinguish between: (a) the outputs of g that have occurred before the d th distinct block-pre x in exec x ( ; g; h) (i.e., bp d ) has been reached, and (b) the outputs of g that have occurred after bp d has been reached. For every possible outcome of (a) we will analyze the (probabilistic) behaviour of g only over the outcomes of (b). (Recall that once (a)'s outcome has been determined, the identities (but not the contents) of all relevant pre xes are well de ned.) Since for every possible outcome of (a) the analysis will hold, it will in particular hold over all choices of g.
More formally, consider the following (alternative) way of describing a uniformly chosen g 2 G (at least as far as exec x ( ; g; h) is concerned). Let g 1 ; g 2 be two t S (n)-wise independent hash functions uniformly chosen from G and let ; h; d be as above. We de ne g (g 1 ;g 2 ) = g ( ;h;d;g 1 ;g 2 ) to be uniformly distributed among the functions g 0 that satisfy the following conditions: the value of g 0 when applied to an input that has occurred before bp d has been reached (in exec x ( ; g; h)) is equal to g 1 ( ), whereas the value of g 0 when applied to an input that has occurred after bp d has been reached is equal to g 2 ( ).
Similarly to the proof of Claim 5.2 it can be shown that for every ; h; d as above, if g 1 and g 2 are uniformly distributed then so is g (g 1 ;g 2 ) . In particular: i By xing g 1 and then analyzing the behaviour of a uniformly chosen g 2 on the relevant iterationpre xes the above technical problem is resolved. This is due to the following two reasons: (1) For every choice of ; h; d and for every xed value of g 1 , the block-pre x bp d is completely determined (and the corresponding iteration-pre xes are well de ned). (2) Once bp d has been reached, the outcome of g (g 1 ;g 2 ) when applied to the relevant iteration-pre xes is completely determined by the choice of g 2 . Thus, all we need to show in order to prove Lemma 5.17 i 2 S there exists an additional successful sub-experiment (that is, a sub-experiment of one of the k c+1 ?k remaining experiments). Using the fact that the probability that a sub-experiment succeeds is n ?1=2k , we infer that the probability that an experiment fully succeeds is equal to (n ?1=2k ) jSj . In particular, the probability in Eq. (11) is upper bounded by the probability that the following two events occur (these events correspond to Claims 5.18:2 and 5.18:3 respectively):
Event 1: In a sequence of (at most k c+1 ) experiments, each succeeding with probability (n ?1=2k ) jSj , there exist k successful experiments. (The success probability corresponds to the probability that for every i 2 S, we have g 2 (i; ip j ) = 1 (see Claim 5.18:2).) Event 2: For every one out of jSj sequences of the remaining (at most k c+1 ?k) sub-experiments, each succeeding with probability n ?1=2k , there exists at least one successful experiment. (In this case, the success probability corresponds to the probability that iteration-pre x ip (i) satis es g 2 (i; ip (i) )=1 (see Claim 5.18:3).)
For i 2 jSj and j 2 k c+1 ], let us denote the success of the i th sub-experiment in the j th experiment by i;j . By the above discussion for every i; j, the probability that i;j holds is n ?1=2k (independently of other i;j 's). We now have that, for Event 1 above to suceed, there must exists a set of k experiments, K k c+1 ], so that for all (i; j) 2 S K, the event i;j holds. For Event 2 to suceed, it must be the case that, for every i 2 S, there exist one additional experiment (i.e., some j 2 k c+1 ] n K) so that i;j holds. It follows that Eq. (11) (13) where Eq. (12) holds whenever k c+1 ?k = o(n 1=2k ) (which is satis ed if k = o( log n log log n )), and Eq. (13) holds whenever (k c+1 ) k+jSj (n ?1=4k ) jSj < 1 (which is satis ed if both jSj > k and k = o( log n log log n )). This means that Eq. (11) 
where Inequality 14 holds whenever 8 e < n 1=4k (which holds for k < log n 4 (3+log e) ). This completes the proof of Lemma 5.7 (since poly(n) 2 ? (n 1=2 ) is negligible).
